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Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.'
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is
no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat
them differently.2
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Justice Harlan wrote his famous dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson,8 the United States Supreme Court has had to face the
problem of how to reconcile the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution
with the reality that race has historically played a major role in the
political and social affairs of this country.4 Race also plays a signifi-
cant role in the legal affairs of this country, as demonstrated by the
Court's affirmative action,5 jury selection,' and, in particular, its
voting rights cases. 7 The Supreme Court has never interpreted color-
blindness to mean that all race-based classifications or preferences
are per se invalid.8 In fact, the Court has "recognized that in order
to remedy the effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v.
Board of Educ. of Topeka (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Plessy, the Court held that "sepa-
rate but equal" railroad accommodations for African-American railroad passengers did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 547-52. According to the Court, "social prejudices [could not
be] overcome by legislation," and "social equality" was not a goal of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 551-52. In 1954, the Brown Court rejected the "separate but equal" doctrine and held that
segregation of public school students based on race created "inherently unequal" facilities. 347
U.S. at 495.
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part & dissenting in part) (holding that a medical school could take race into account as part of
the admissions process).
3. 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4. See generally RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990 1-10 (Paul Finkelman, ed.,
1992) (describing African-American social and legal history in the United States); see also Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (invalidating a law prohibiting inter-racial marriage); Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (invalidating a racially restrictive "pre-primary" election);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944) (invalidating a racially restrictive primary election).
5. See infra notes 192-209 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence).
6. See infra notes 210-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's jury selection
jurisprudence).
7. See infra notes 112-91 and accompanying text (discussing some of the Court's decisions in
voting rights cases).
8. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that in today's society, race is sometimes relevant to governmental decisionmaking); Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that under certain circum-
stances, race-based classifications are valid in order to achieve diversity in medical school).
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take race into account."" The Supreme Court's cases indicate that
the primary difficulty is defining how far policy makers can go when
making race-based distinctions, and the contexts in which racial
classifications are permissible. Shaw v. Reno' ° is among the latest in
a long line of Supreme Court cases which illustrate this struggle.
In Shaw, the Court was faced with a race-based classification in-
volving congressional redistricting by the North Carolina state legis-
lature." Shortly after the 1990 Census, the state legislature created
an unusually shaped congressional district to provide effective repre-
sentation for the state's roughly twenty percent African-American
population. 12 In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court stated that
the redistricting scheme was so irrational on its face that it could
only be understood as an effort to segregate voters by race.' 3 Thus,
the Court held that the Appellants stated a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4  Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that districts which are
unexplainable on grounds other than race are harmful because they
"threaten to carry us further from the goal of a political system in
which race no longer matters," and "may balkanize us into compet-
ing racial factions."' 5 She added that all racial classifications are
potentially harmful because "they reinforce the belief. . . that indi-
viduals should be judged by the color of their skin."'"
The Shaw case threatens to undermine many of the Court's vot-
ing rights cases,' 7 including the landmark decision in Thornburg v.
Gingles.'8 Shaw may also significantly affect the Court's jurispru-
dence in other areas of the law which involve racial classifications,
particularly the Court's affirmative action' and jury selection juris-
prudence. 0 The decision is particularly troubling because race-con-
9. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280.
10. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
11. Id. at 2819-21.
12. Id. at 2820-21.




17. See infra notes 355-468 and accompanying text (discussing why it is difficult to reconcile
Shaw with the Court's previous voting rights cases).
18. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see infra notes 356-99 and accompanying text (discussing why Shaw is
inconsistent with Thornburg).
19. See infra notes 513-49 and accompanying text (discussing why Shaw is inconsistent with
the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence).
20. See infra notes 550-83 and accompanying text (discussing why Shaw is inconsistent with
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sciousness is arguably more appropriate in voting rights than in
other contexts. 1 For the first time, the Supreme Court in Shaw held
that a congressional district that simply appears "bizarre" is auto-
matically subject to strict scrutiny review. 2 This is true even if the
district was admittedly created to benefit a minority group and to
comply with the 1965 Voting Rights Act.2"
Before 1992, several states with substantial African-American
populations, including North Carolina, had failed to send an Afri-
can-American to Congress since Reconstruction.' Many states with
substantial African-American populations have had to create unusu-
ally-shaped districts to comply with the Voting Rights Act to pro-
vide for effective representation of their African-American popula-
tions. 5 After Shaw, many of these districts are now vulnerable to
legal challenge.26
Section I discusses the historical background of African-Ameri-
can voting rights in this country, with particular emphasis on North
Carolina.27 Next, Section I presents an examination of the 1965
Voting Rights Act, along with a summary of the Court's major vot-
ing rights, affirmative action, and jury selection cases.2 Section II
summarizes the facts and issues presented in the Shaw case and
examines the majority and dissenting opinions.2 9 Section III ana-
lyzes the Court's holding and argues that the case is inconsistent
with precedent, ignores the purposes behind the Voting Rights Act,
the Court's jury selection jurisprudence).
21. See infra notes 584-607 and accompanying text (discussing why it is more appropriate for
legislators to consider race when creating voting districts than in other contexts).
22. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993).
23. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) (holding that Ohio's apportionment
plan creating several majority-minority districts does not violate the Voting Rights Act); United
Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1977) (concluding that the use of racial criteria in
redistricting to comply with the Voting Rights Act will often be necessary and does not violate the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution).
24. See Susan B. Glasser, Who's Next? Black, Hispanic Members Fear Lawsuits After Court's
N.C. Ruling, ROLL CALL, July 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rollcl File. States
which had never sent an African-American to Congress prior to 1992 include Alabama, Florida,
South Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
25. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 473-76 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (finding no violation of
the Voting Rights Act where minority voters formed effective voting majorities in a number of
districts roughly proportional to their respective shares in the voting population).
26. See infra notes 608-40 and accompanying text (discussing some of these other districts, and
relevant Supreme Court and lower court decisions since Shaw).
27. See infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 56-245 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 246-348 and accompanying text.
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and represents bad policy.30 Finally, Section IV discusses the proba-
ble impact of the case on other congressional districts around the
country and on subsequent Supreme Court cases.8'
I. BACKGROUND
A. African-American Voting Rights in North Carolina
Before the Civil War, very few African-Americans enjoyed the
right to vote. 32 African-Americans were not permitted to vote at all
in southern states, and fewer than ten percent of adult African-
American males were allowed to vote in the rest of the country. 3
This situation changed with the passage of the Thirteenth,3 Four-
teenth, 8 and Fifteenth Amendments 38 (the Civil War Amendments)
between 1865 and 1870.11 Soon after these Amendments were
passed, significant numbers of African-Americans were elected to
Congress. 38 Before 1877, two southern African-Americans were
elected to the Senate and fourteen to the House of Representa-
tives.3 9 Unfortunately for African-Americans, their enjoyment of
the right to vote would soon come to a dramatic end. Despite the
fact that the Civil War Amendments were primarily passed in order
to protect the rights of recently freed slaves,4 state legislatures con-
tinued to curtail African-American voting rights for the next cen-
30. See infra notes 349-607 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 608-41 and accompanying text.
32. Brainerd Dyer, One Hundred Years of Negro Suffrage, 37 PAC. HIST. REV. 1, 1 (1968),
reprinted in 6 RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990, supra note 4, at 123, 123.
33. Id.
34. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1.
35. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying any citizen the equal protection
of law. Id. amend. XIV, § 2. Although the Fourteenth Amendment's provision securing citizens
equal protection of the laws provided African-Americans with a means to secure political equality,
this provision was not extensively used by the courts for this purpose until well into the Twentieth
Century. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING II (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
36. The Fifteenth Amendment guarantees the right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
37. SUSAN WELCH ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 184 (2d ed. 1988).
38. Id.
39. Id. In 1872, 324 African-Americans were elected to southern state legislatures and Con-
gress. By 1900, this number had diminished to five. J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act
and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 35, at 135,
140.
40. For a discussion of Congress's intent in passing the Fourteenth Amendment, see WE. NEL-
SON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 148-96
(1988).
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tury. ' Devices such as literacy tests,42 grandfather clauses, 3 poll
taxes,44 and white primaries,45 were widely used in southern states
to suppress African-American voting rights."
North Carolina's response to the Civil War Amendments was typ-
ical of most southern states. 7 For the most part, the state complied
with voting rights laws until the late nineteenth century when fed-
eral troops withdrew from the South, and the infamous Plessy v.
Ferguson4 8 case was decided.4 9 In 1900, North Carolina amended
its Constitution to include provisions allowing literacy tests, grand-
41. See, e.g., JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (4th ed. 1974) (discussing vari-
ous methods used by the states to curtail African-American voting rights). In a number of deci-
sions including the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1876), and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Supreme Court seriously
curtailed other Congressional efforts to promote racial equality. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 391 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
42. The use of literacy tests in the late Nineteenth Century curtailed African-American voting
rights because most African-Americans were illiterate at- this time. Derrick Bell, The Supreme
Court, 1984 Term - Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 72 n.177
(1985). The Supreme Court upheld a 1970 Amendment to the Voting Rights Act which prohib-
ited literacy tests nationally in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
43. A grandfather clause in the North Carolina Constitution exempted anyone whose lineal
ancestor had the right to vote before 1867 (before African-Americans had the right to vote) from
taking a literacy test. John V. Orth, North Carolina Constitutional History, 70 NC. L. REV.
1759, 1786 (1992). The Supreme Court held that the use of a grandfather clause violated the
Fifteenth Amendment in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
44. The Supreme Court held that use of a poll tax violates the Fourteenth Amendment in
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). A poll tax is "a tax of a
specific sum levied upon each person within the jurisdiction of the taxing power and within a
certain class (as, all males of a certain age, etc.) without reference to his property or lack of it."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (6th ed. 1990).
45. African-Americans were barred from voting in primary elections where only white candi-
dates were selected. In Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), the Supreme Court held that this
practice violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
46. See generally Dyer, supra note 32, at 130-42 (discussing the various uses of discriminatory
devices by the states). The effect of these devices was staggering. Illustrative is Louisiana where
by 1900, the number of registered African-American voters dropped from 130,000 to 5,000. Ar-
mand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 542 (1973),
reprinted in 6 RACE. LAW. AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990, supra note 4, at 43, 62.
47. See, e.g., Robert N. Hunter, Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act in North
Carolina, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 255, 256-63 (1987) (discussing historical curtailment of African-
American voting rights in North Carolina). Extensive voting discrimination took place in the
North as well. See generally Kousser, supra note 39, at 137 (stating that in the North, African-
Americans were disenfranchised to a great extent and in eight out of eleven referendums, whites
voted against providing for equal suffrage).
48. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka (Brown I), 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (upholding separate-but-equal accommodations for African-American and white rail-
road passengers).
49. See Hunter, supra note 47, at 257-60 (describing how African-Americans in North Caro-
lina played a significant role in state politics until the late 19th century when a series of initiatives
were implemented which were designed to curtail African-American voting rights).
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father clauses, and poll taxes.5 0 Throughout the first half of the
twentieth century, vigilante groups such as the Ku Klux Klan beat,
lynched, and burned the houses of African-American voters.5
State-sponsored voting discrimination continued until well into the
late 1970's.2 An African-American did not serve in North Caro-
lina's General Assembly again until 1970.58 Although the state's Af-
rican-American population is roughly twenty-two percent, before
1984 less than five percent of the General Assembly consisted of
African-Americans.54 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted
in response to the inequities these figures represent. 5
B. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Amendments
1. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the Act)
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson asked Congress to pass a
tough, comprehensive voting law after concluding that case-by-case
litigation and the voting provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957,
1960, and 1964 were not adequate to combat pervasive voting rights
discrimination in this country. 6 Representative Emanuel Celler, the
floor manager of the bill, argued that the bill would prevent white
racists from using "legal dodges and subterfuges" to undermine the
intent of the Fifteenth Amendment. 7 Before the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 was passed, a house report indicated that a tougher voting
rights law was needed because of "the variety of means used to bar
Negro voting and the durability of such discriminatory policies '58
50. N.C CONST. of 1900, art. VI, § 4.
51. Hunter, supra note 47, at 257-58; see also Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice:
The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 881-905 (1982),
reprinted in 6 RACE. LAW. AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990, supra note 4, at 401, 449-73
(discussing Ku Klux Klan activities in the South during the first half of the Twentieth Century).
52. See Hunter, supra note 47, at 260.
53. Id. at 261.
54. Id.
55. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)); see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the reasons for the enactment of the Voting Rights Act).
56. Dyer, supra note 32, at 140; see also Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief
History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING. supra note 35, at 7, 17-21 (discussing Presi-
dent Johnson's role in securing passage of the Voting Rights Act).
57. Davidson, supra note 56, at 18. Several southern Senators were in strong opposition to the
bill. Senator Herman E. Talmadge of Georgia said the bill was "grossly unjust and vindictive,"
and Senator Strom Thurmund of South Carolina feared that if the bill was passed, "we [would]
have a totalitarian state in which there will be despotism and tyranny." Id.
58. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1486 (Bernard Schwartz
924 [Vol. 44:917
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and, "the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the polls that char-
acterizes certain regions of this nation.''"
Sections 4 through 8 constitute the main provisions of the Voting
Rights Act. Section 4 abolishes literacy tests in all states and their
subdivisions which had a voter turnout rate of less than fifty percent
in the last presidential election and used a literacy test at the time.60
Section 5 has become the Voting Rights Act's most important provi-
sion6 and was at the heart of the controversy in Shaw. 2 This sec-
tion requires states which fall under section 4 to submit to the At-
torney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia
any changes in "voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting" that was not
in effect during the last Presidential election.6 This preclearance re-
quirement gives the Attorney General great power in insuring local
voting rights laws are in compliance with section 2's general man-
date that the practices do not "deny or abridge the right to vote on
account of race or color." Sections 6 through 8 give the Attorney
General power to send federal voting examiners to make sure quali-
fied citizens are allowed to register, and that the voting process is
administered in a manner consistent with the Voting Rights Act.65
ed., 1970).
59. 2 id. Additionally, the report indicated that many cases, such as United States v. Louisiana,
225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963) (finding invalid a state constitutional requirement that appli-
cants for voting registration be able to understand and give a reasonable interpretation of any
provision of the state or federal constitution), affid, Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145
(1965), demonstrate that literacy tests and other devices were systematically and consciously used
to deprive African-Americans of the right to vote. 2 id., at 1488-89. In many places, the tests were
never applied to whites and the language of some of the tests allowed their administration to be
performed in such an arbitrary and vague manner that their "only real function [is] to foster
racial discrimination." 2 id. at 1489.
60. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988)). The main coverage of this provision was in southern states, including
40 out of 100 counties in North Carolina. Davidson, supra note 56, at 18.
61. See generally Davidson, supra note 56, at 27-30 (describing the effectiveness of section 5
challenges, especially as a weapon against minority vote dilution).
62. See infra notes 246-348 and accompanying text (discussing Shaw v. Reno).
63. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988)); see also Davidson, supra note 56, at 19 (noting that
section 5 allows the Justice Department to monitor a region's election procedures and to object to
discriminatory changes).
64. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988)).
65. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 6-8, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973d-f (1988)). Officials are required to provide illiterate voters with as much
"reasonable assistance" as necessary so the voter can cast his ballot in accordance with his deci-
sion. See Hamer v. Ely, 410 F.2d 152, 155-57 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that a refusal to appoint
1995]
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The Court upheld the Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,6 as a permissible exercise of
Congress' power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment "to
enforce . . by appropriate legislation" the right guaranteed by
Section 1 of that Amendment. 7 In Katzenbach, the Court stated
that "in addition to the courts, Congress has full remedial powers to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination
in voting." 68
2. Amendments to the Voting Rights Act
The Act's temporary provisions were due to expire five years after
the Act was passed.6 9 Despite vocal opposition by many southern
officials, 7 0 Congress extended the Act's temporary provisions for five
more years in a 1970 Amendment.7 1 The Amendment covered addi-
tional states, and abolished literacy tests nationally. 2 In 1975, the
Commission on Civil Rights reported that the Act was successful in
increasing the number of African-Americans who registered and
voted."
Unfortunately, African-Americans continued to be grossly under-
represented, both nationally and at the state level .7  When the Com-
mission reported its findings, there was only one African-American
congressman, and no African-American held a high state office in
the South.75 Because of these circumstances, Congress extended the
African-American officials to aid illiterate voters was not a violation of the Voting Rights Amend-
ments), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 942 (1969).
66. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). The Court rejected the state's contention that, "Congress may appro-
priately do no more than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms-that
the task of fashioning specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities must necessa-
rily be left entirely to the courts." Id. at 326; see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544, 570-71 (1969) (stating that courts should construe section 5 broadly, and apply it to any
practice than could "undermine the effectiveness of voters").
67. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325-26.
68. Id. at 326.
69. Davidson, supra note 56, at 18.
70. Governor Lester G. Maddox of Georgia, who prevented African-Americans from entering
his restaurant by threatening them with a pickaxe handle, called the Act "ungodly" and "unpatri-
otic." Id. at 29. After making the speech containing these references to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, he immediately went to the House restaurant to autograph souvenir pickaxe handles.
Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 29-30.
73. Id. at 34.
74. Id.
75. Id. These states were not covered before because they did not have a voter turnout rate of
926 [Vol. 44:917
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Act's temporary provisions for another seven years. 76 More impor-
tantly, states with substantial African-American and other minority
group populations, such as Texas, that were previously not covered
by the Act were brought under its provisions.77
3. The Requisite Standard for Cases Under the Voting Rights Act
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided the controversial case of
Mobile v. Bolden.78 For the first time, the Court held that minority
plaintiffs making a claim under the Constitution or the Voting
Rights Act had to prove that the legislative body enacted or re-
tained a voting scheme with the intent of discriminating against a
racial group.79 This proved disastrous for minority groups, since this
burden of proof was extremely difficult to meet.80
Fortunately for minority groups, Congress was sympathetic to
their need to secure favorable voting rights legislation and in 1982,
when the temporary provisions of the Voting Right Act were due to
expire, Congress extended them for another twenty-five years.81 Ad-
ditionally, Congress expressed its disagreement with the intent test
established in Mobile because it made a minority plaintiff's burden
of proof "inordinately difficult."' 82 Thus, Congress amended section
2 of the Act to explicitly prohibit any voting practice which results
in racial discrimination. 3 House and Senate reports accompanying
less than 50% in the presidential election before the Act was passed. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text (describing the conditions under which states would be covered under the Act).
76. Davidson, supra note 56, at 35.
77. Id. at 35-36. Additionally, the Amendment required covered states with Asian-American,
American-Indian, Native Alaskan and Latino populations of more than five percent to provide
election materials in these languages. Id.
78. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Mobile involved an at-large voting scheme in Alabama which had been
in effect since 1911. Id. at 58. African-Americans claimed the scheme diluted their sizeable voting
strength because they were unable to elect African-American candidates. Id. at 71-73. The Su-
preme Court refused to invalidate the scheme. Id. at 80.
79. Id. at 66-67.
80. Id. at 67. After Mobile, the number of lawsuits claiming voting discrimination diminished
substantially, and defendants were "intransigent and refused to discuss settlement." Laughlin Mc-
Donald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING, supra note 35, at 66, 67 (citing Frank R. Parker, The Impact of City of
Mobile v. Bolden and Strategies and Legal Arguments for Voting Cases in Its Wake, in THE
RIGHT TO VOTE: A ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION REPORT 111-12 (Rockefeller Foundation 1981)).
81. Davidson, supra note 56, at 40.
82. McDonald, supra note 80, at 68.
83. Id. at 67; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §2, 79 Stat. 437 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1973(a) (1988)) ("No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
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the Amendment indicate that courts should look to a number of ob-
jective factors, such as historical racial discrimination in the area,
racially polarized voting, and any lack of elected minority office
holders, to determine whether a practice has resulted in racial
discrimination.84
The Voting Rights Act has had a profound impact on securing
the right to vote for African-Americans. In the eleven southern
states covered under the Act, the percentage of African-Americans
over age eighteen registered to vote increased from 43.3% in 1964
to 63.7% in 1988.85 Seven states, including North Carolina, were
originally targeted by the Act. 6 In 1965, less than 100 African-
American officials were elected from these states.8  By 1989, this
number had increased to 3,265.88 After the 1990 Census, race-con-
scious redistricting doubled the number of majority-minority dis-
tricts from twenty-six to fifty-two.89 In 1990, thirty-nine of the 535
United States congressmen were African-American or Latino, and
in 1992 the number increased to fifty-nine.90
C. Equal Protection Analysis in Race-Based Classifications
Plessy v. Ferguson91 was the first case in which a Supreme Court
States to vote on account of race or color.").
84. McDonald, supra note 80, at 68. Most of the factors Congress listed were taken from the
Court's decision in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70.(1973) and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir.
1973). Two days after the Amendment became law, the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613 (1982), held that a racially discriminatory purpose can be inferred from a voting
scheme's effect of diluting a minority group's voting strength, combined with other circumstantial
evidence. Id. at 622-28. Rogers involved an at-large voting system in a substantially African-
American county where no African-American had ever been elected to the county's governing
Board of Commissioners. Id. at 614-15. The Court deferred to the district court's findings that the
community had experienced a long history of voting rights discrimination, and local elected offi-
cials were unresponsive to the needs of the African-American population. Id. at 622-26. In
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991), the Court held that the Act is applicable to state judi-
cial elections. Id. at 384.
85. Davidson, supra note 56, at 43. During the same period, the number of African Americans
over age 18 registered to vote in the five Deep South states increased from 22.5% to 65.2%. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. For 1965, there are no comparable figures available regarding Latino elected officials.
However, in Arizona, California, Florida, New Mexico, New York and Texas, 1,280 Latino offi-
cials were elected in 1973, and 3,592 were elected in 1990. Id.
89. Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting: White Voters Challenge
Black Majority Map, WASH. POST. Apr. 20, 1983, at A4.
90. Dennis Rivera, Democracy and Diversity, NEWSDAY, July 30, 1993, at 56.
91. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka (Brown 1), 347 U.S.
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Justice articulated the notion of a color-blind Constitution.92 Al-
though the majority upheld separate-but-equal accommodations for
African-American and white railroad passengers, 93 Justice Harlan's
dissent became the implicit basis for later cases. Such cases include
the Court striking down a city ordinance requiring separate city
blocks for African-Americans and whites, 94 a state law which forced
African-Americans who sought a legal education to attend school
outside of the state, 5 a law which forbade African-Americans from
attending the same law school as whites,96 and the state laws which
mandated segregated public schools."
These early cases illustrated blatant attempts by legislators to dis-
criminate against African-Americans. Most of the recent cases in-
volving race-based classifications involve more subtle forms of racial
discrimination, or in some cases, "benign" discrimination - which
many argue is not discrimination at all, but rather a means of reme-
dying prior racial discrimination. In order to fully understand how
the courts analyze voting rights cases, it is necessary to first under-
stand how they analyze race-based classifications generally. A race-
based classification is normally subject to strict scrutiny review. 99
Prior to City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,1 0 strict scrutiny
analysis was usually reserved for groups that have historically been
the victims of discrimination.'' Strict scrutiny will only be applied
483 (1954).
92. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
93. Id. at 548.
94. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
95. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938).
96. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 642 (1950).
97. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
98. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1521 (2d ed.
1988) (stating that affirmative action or benign discrimination programs are sometimes used to
eliminate the effects of past discrimination).
99. Under strict scrutiny review, the burden of proof shifts to the government to show that it
has a compelling government interest in making a racial classification. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 44, at 1422. The only time the Court upheld explicit racial discrimination under strict
scrutiny was in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding a law which ex-
cluded persons of Japanese origin from certain West Coast areas); TRIBE. supra note 98, § 16-6,
at 1451-52. Strict scrutiny is contrasted with the rational basis test, an extremely deferential
standard which holds that a racial classification is valid if it is, "reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY. supra note 44, at 1262.
100. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
101. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating a municipal ordinance
that stated a city council could not take measures to eliminate racial discrimination in housing
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if there is proof of purposeful (or intentional) discrimination. 2 This
usually refers to invidious discrimination which is sometimes de-
scribed as discrimination on account of an immutable characteristic
such as race or sex.' 0 3 In Strauder v. West Virginia,'04 the Court
struck down a statute which allowed only whites to serve on juries
because the statute discriminated on its face, and intentional dis-
crimination could thus be presumed.' 05 In contrast, Washington v.
Davis'0 6 held that proof of a discriminatory impact alone is nor-
mally not enough to constitute an equal protection violation.0
However, a discriminatory impact alone is enough to constitute an
Equal Protection violation when a differential in effect is so great
that it must reflect a discriminatory purpose108
The Court recently held that the rule applies even if the classifi-
cation was designed to benefit a minority group.. For example, in
Croson, the Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a race-con-
scious affirmative action program designed to aid minority construc-
without majority approval by the city's voters); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (hold-
ing that the systematic exclusion of Latinos from juries is invalid); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886) (holding that systematic discrimination against Asian laundry operators violated the
Equal Protection Clause). Modern use of strict scrutiny in racial classifications is traceable to
U.S. v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In that case, Justice Stone wrote, "[p]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, . . . which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 152-53 n.4. Professor Laurence Tribe
argues that, "the device of strict scrutiny is most powerfully employed for the examination of
political outcomes challenged as injurious to those groups in society which have occupied, as a
consequence of widespread, insistent prejudice against them, the position of perennial losers in the
political struggle." TRIBE. supra note 98, at 1453-54.
102. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-46 (1976) (explaining that proof of
purposeful discrimination is a necessary predicate of a successful Equal Protection claim, but that
a discriminatory purpose can sometimes be inferred from the effects).
103. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-88 (1973). In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976), the Court began using an intermediate level of scrutiny for discrimination based on gen-
der. Id. at 197-204.
104. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
105. Id. Similarly, in Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1976), the Court
stated that an adverse effect can reflect invidious gender-based discrimination. Id. at 274.
106. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
107. Id. at 246. The fact that African-Americans failed police examinations four times more
frequently than whites was not enough to infer that the test was created or administered to dis-
criminate against African-Americans. Id.; see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274-76 (holding that to
show discriminatory intent, a plaintiff must prove that legislation was consciously enacted because
of its discriminatory impact, and not merely with a passive awareness of such an impact).
108. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (finding a discriminatory purpose based on
an otherwise unexplainable differential impact on a minority group); see also Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977) (listing criteria for determining
when a differential impact suffices to imply a discriminatory purpose).
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tion contractors.' 0 9 Unlike Congress, which has a specific constitu-
tional mandate to remedy societal discrimination through Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a municipality is generally not al-
lowed to take steps to remedy societal discrimination." 0 Therefore,
the majority concluded that awarding public contracting opportuni-
ties to persons based on their race was not a compelling government
interest."' Croson dramatically illustrates how the Court has be-
come willing to apply strict scrutiny analysis to cases in which
whites are disadvantaged.
D. Equal Protection in Minority Voting Rights Cases
1. Early Cases
In the 1966 case of Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elec-
tions,1 2 the Supreme Court for the first time held that the right to
vote is fundamental."' The Court found that even minor inequities
in the way voting rights are administered are subject to strict scru-
tiny review."" Thus, one must examine voting rights cases in light
of voting's major importance to the American democratic system,
particularly in the context of federal elections. 1 5
In the 1960 case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot,"' the Alabama legis-
109. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989) (plurality opinion).
110. Id. at 487-93. This was particularly true in this case since minorities comprised over 50%
of the city's population, and there was no evidence of past discrimination against minority contrac-
tors initiated by the city or other contractors. Id. at 501.
111. Id. at 505. The dissent argued that since the city found a "'strong,' 'firm,' and 'unques-
tionably legitimate' basis" upon which to conclude that the effect of past discrimination warranted
remedial measures, the legislation should be sustained. Id. at 541 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
113. Id. at 670.
114. Id. In Harper, the Court struck down the imposition of an annual poll tax of $1.50. Id. at
665. The Court was concerned that the tax would keep the impoverished away from the polls, thus
infringing on their right to participate in the electoral process. Id. at 668.
115. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 741-44 (1973) (standing for the proposition that
state districting schemes are subject to lower standards than those applied to congressional dis-
tricting plans). Voting districts are required to have the same number of people in each district so
that the votes of people in some districts are not "worth more" than the votes in other districts.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (establishing the one-man, one-vote require-
ment); see also infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (discussing Gomillion). This one-man,
one-vote principle is of particular importance in federal elections. For example, in Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), a congressional redistricting scheme which had a maximum per-
centage deviation of only point seven percent between the value of votes in two districts was held
invalid. Id. at 727, 732. In contrast, in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), a state redistrict-
ing plan which had a maximum percentage deviation of over 16%, was constitutionally permissi-
ble. Id. at 328-29.
116. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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lature changed the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee from a square
to an "irregular twenty-eight sided figure." 117 All but a handful of
the city's African-American voters were effectively fenced out of the
city's boundaries, while none of the white voters were. 118 In finding
a clear Fifteenth Amendment violation, Justice Frankfurter stated,
"the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and
colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive
them of their pre-existing municipal vote.""1 9 He also stated that a
statute with this "inevitable effect" and no countervailing municipal
function is clearly invalid.120
Shortly after Gomillion, the Court decided Baker v. Carr,2 ' the
case which "launched the modern era of voting rights jurispru-
dence."' 22 In Baker, the Court held for the first time that a state
legislature's apportionment of voters was a justiciable issue. 2  The
case inspired a series of voting rights cases, not all of which resulted
in Court decisions as favorable to minority interests as Gomillion.
For example, in Wright v. Rockefeller,124 minority voters in New
York claimed that congressional districts located in their county
were gerrymandered in order to confine a disproportionate number
of the county's African-American and Latino population into one
district. 125 The inevitable effect of the plan was that only one of the
four district representatives would be from a minority group.1 26 Al-
though the Court acknowledged that there was a strong inference
117. Id. at 339-41.
118. Id. at 341.
119. Id.
120. Id. The decision is similar to Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), in the sense that
where a discriminatory effect is so extreme that it can only be explained as purposeful discrimina-
tion, a violation has been shown. See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (inter-
preting Gomillion as turning on the unconstitutional effect of the legislation).
121. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
122. Alexander Athan Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote with the Voting Rights Act,
92 COLUM L. REv. 1810, 1815 (1992). Although it was not clear at the time, the case had tre-
mendous significance in the area of racial vote dilution. Davidson, supra note 56, at 31; see Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (stating that a state could not dilute votes on the basis of
race under the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
545, 568 (1964) (holding that a legislative districting scheme in which some districts contained
more than 40 times the number of voters as other residents, thereby diluting their voting strength,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
123. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237. In Baker, the state legislature had failed to reapportion itself for
60 years. Id. at 191. Due to population growth and redistribution during this time, the plaintiffs'
votes became diluted in relation to voters in other counties. Id. at 193-94.
124. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).




that the districts were created with this unlawful purpose in mind, it
held that the plaintiffs failed to present specific evidence that the
state legislature in fact drew the districts along racial lines.' 2 7 Simi-
larly, in Whitcomb v. Chavis,12 8 the Court refused to invalidate a
multi-member voting district which operated to minimize the voting
strength of African-American voters.'29 In this case, the Court held
that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving how the use
of multi-member districts minimized African-American voting
strength or that the legislature intended to discriminate against Af-
rican-Americans.130
2. The Court Becomes More Sympathetic to Minority Voters
The Court finally struck down a multi-member voting district
scheme in White v. Regester.'a' Although the Court did not find
that the scheme was facially invalid,1 2 the minority plaintiffs did
meet the burden of proving their "members had less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to participate in the political
process and to elect legislators of their choice.' 3 3 The Court cited a
number of factors that led it to believe minorities were unfairly ex-
cluded from the political process in Texas. Among the factors were:
(1) Texas historically participated in official racial discrimination;' 3
(2) only two African-Americans from the Dallas County delegation
had been elected to the Texas House of Representatives since Re-
construction; 3 5 and (3) the local candidate slating body used "racial
campaign tactics in white precincts to defeat candidates who had
127. Id. at 55-58. Ironically, in favoring the minority groups' position, the dissent used lan-
guage which was echoed in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993), nearly 30 years later to
invalidate an unusually-shaped district designed to benefit minorities. Id. at 59 (Douglas, J., &
Goldberg, J., dissenting). The dissent in Wright argued that the state legislature used "zigzag
tortuous lines [to] concentrate Negroes and Puerto Ricans [in the same district]," and the district
"can only be explained in racial terms." Id.; see also City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358, 370-71, 378 (1975) (holding that a city's annexation of adjacent county land would not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and that a discrim-
inatory purpose was not shown in the case).
128. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
129. Id. at 163.
130. Id. at 149-55.
131. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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the overwhelming support of the black community."'' 6 Similar find-
ings were made with regard to the Latino population.' These ob-
jective factors were later used as illustrations in House and Senate
reports accompanying the Amendments to the Voting Rights Act so
that courts would know what to look for under the "results test."' 38
A case which elaborated on enforcement of section 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act was Beer v. United States.3 9 After the 1970 Census,
New Orleans enacted a redistricting plan to apportion seats for the
city council.'4 The Attorney General refused to give the plan
preclearance, and the city brought a declaratory judgment action.'
In invalidating the plan, the district court held that the scheme was
inconsistent with the Voting Rights Act, because it didn't allow Af-
rican-Americans to elect representatives in proportion to their popu-
lation.'42 The Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment,
and stated, "a legislative reapportionment that enhances the position
of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise can hardly have the effect of diluting or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of Sec-
tion 5."111 One commentator argues that the following principles
came out of Beer:
Section 5 precludes changes that have a retrogressive effect on the preexist-
ing voting rights of minorities, and ameliorative changes, even if they fall
short of what might be accomplished in terms of increasing minority repre-
sentation, cannot be found to violate section 5 unless they so discriminate on
the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution. The New Orleans
plan was ameliorative, not retrogressive.14 4
136. Id. at 767.
137. Id. The Court noted that Latinos in the area suffered from invidious discrimination in
many different fields. Id. According to the Court, the Latino voter, "suffers a cultural and lan-
guage barrier that makes his participation in community processes extremely difficult." Id.
138. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing the 1982 Amendments to the
Voting Rights Act). In addition to the White case, criteria for determining vote dilution were also
taken from Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affid on other
grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
139. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 137.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 141. Moreover, the Court stated that, "there is every reason to predict, upon the
District Court's hypothesis of bloc voting, that at least one and perhaps two Negroes may well be
elected to the council under [the present plan]." Id. at 142.
144. Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING, supra note 35, at 52, 56; see also Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 136 (1983)
(applying principles established in Beer in finding that the introduction of staggered terms would
not have a "retrogressive effect on minority voting strength").
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In United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey,"' (UJO) white
Hasidic Jews claimed that a state's splitting up of their district in
order to create two majority African-American districts was uncon-
stitutional.14 It was undisputed that the redistricting was an inten-
tional attempt to guarantee the voting strength of African-American
voters by creating "substantial nonwhite majorities in [two] dis-
tricts." 47 The redistricting scheme was created to comply with the
Voting Rights Act and received preclearance from the Attorney
General." 8
In upholding the plan, Justice White, speaking for a plurality,
first observed that the Act was, " 'designed by Congress to banish
the blight of racial discrimination in voting.' "149 The Court held
that "neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment man-
dates any per se rule against using racial factors in redistricting."' 50
According to the Court, it is proper for the state to take steps to
make sure there is a fair opportunity for the African-American pop-
ulation to elect an African-American representative. 5' Further, the
Court stated that even if the plan was not mandated by the Voting
Rights Act, it "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to
whites or any other race" and did not violate the Fourteenth or Fif-
teenth Amendments.' 52 As long as white voters as a group were
fairly represented, individual white voters could not claim a Consti-
tutional violation.' 53
The Court acknowledged that although voting based on a candi-
date's race is an unfortunate reality, this did not mean the state was
powerless to minimize the consequences of racially discriminatory
voting by maintaining the voting strengths of certain groups.1 54 Jus-
tice Brennan, in his concurrence, argued that a state's remedial use
of race was not always forbidden.' 55 In a separate concurrence, Jus-
tice Stewart argued that the plaintiffs failed to show the scheme had
the purpose or the effect of discriminating against them on the basis
145. 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 153.
148. Id. at 157.
149. Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
150. Id. at 160.
151. Id. (citing City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1975)).
152. Id. at 165.
153. Id. at 166-68.
154. Id. at 165-69.
155. Id. at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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of their race. 150
3. A Drastic Change By the Court and An Equally Drastic Con-
gressional Response
As discussed above, the Mobile 57 case was a setback for African-
American voting rights.1 58 The city of Mobile used an at-large
multi-member voting district scheme to elect its city commission-
ers. 159 Although the city had an African-American population of
thirty-three percent, no African-American had been elected to the
commission in seventy years.160 A Supreme Court plurality held
that in order for the African-American plaintiffs to prevail, they
would have to show more than a lack of proportional representation
of their population.161 The plurality held that the plaintiff had to
show that the purpose (or intent) of the legislative scheme was to
"invidiously . . . minimize or cancel out the voting potential of ra-
cial or ethnic minorities.' 62 In an apparent retreat from the White
case, the Court held that evidence of the discriminatory effect of
this plan fell far short of what was needed to show the scheme was
enacted or retained to promote racial discrimination. 8
In response to harsh criticism of the Mobile decision, Congress
amended the Voting Rights Act to establish that a discriminatory
purpose was not an essential element of a voting rights claim. 6
This Amendment and the corresponding Rogers v. Lodge decision
seemed to make clear that an intent to discriminate did not have to
be specifically proven in a voting rights case but could be inferred
156. Id. at 181 (Stewart, J., concurring).
157. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
158. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Mobile case).
159. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 56-60.
160. Timothy G. O'Rourke, The Voting Rights Paradox, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING. supra note 35, at 85, 95 n.28.
161. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 67.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 71. The Mobile case received much criticism from commentators. See, e.g., Frank
R. Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent
Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 737-46 (1983) (arguing that since the right to vote is so fundamen-
tal to our democratic system, minority citizens' access to the political process should not depend
upon their ability to prove discriminatory intent underlying questionable election schemes). In a
case decided on the same day as Mobile, the Court held that a municipality could not be
precleared by the Attorney General under the Voting Rights Act unless both discriminatory pur-
pose and effect were absent. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980).
164. Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial Polit-
ics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105, 143 (1992).
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from the scheme's effect and other circumstantial evidence. 165
The most significant voting rights case of the past decade was the
1986 case of Thornburg v. Gingles.'66 In that case, the Court for the
first time attempted to define a standard for proving dilution of a
minority group's voting rights .117 In Thornburg, African-American
voters challenged North Carolina's state legislative redistricting
scheme by alleging that the plan impaired their ability to elect rep-
resentatives of their choice.1 1 8 The Court began its analysis by ex-
amining the extensive racial discrimination suffered by African-
Americans in North Carolina, both generally and in the context of
voting rights. 69 It also accepted the lower court's finding that white
candidates had encouraged voting along racial lines, and that very
few African-Americans had been elected to office in North Caro-
lina. 17 0 Next, the Court held that Congress explicitly rejected the
Mobile plurality's "intent test" by enacting the 1982 Voting Rights
Act Amendments.' Most importantly, the Court held that vote di-
lution "was to be measured by the actual electoral practices of the
day, and the polarized voting inquiry was to be its evidentiary
centerpiece. "172
The Court stated that in order to prove racially polarized voting,
"a bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat candidates
supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority
group.' 8 The Court held that the degree of racial bloc voting nec-
essary to prove a claim under section 2 will vary according to vari-
ous factual circumstances. '7 Nevertheless, the Court stated that as
a general principle, racial bloc voting occurs when substantial num-
bers of the same minority group vote for the same candidate, the
white bloc vote is large enough to normally defeat the minority
group's candidates (even when white "crossover" votes are in-
cluded), and this process occurs over a lengthy period of time.17 5 In
165. 458 U.S. 613 (1982); see supra note 84 (discussing the facts and holding of Rogers).
166, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
167. Id. at 31, 55-58.
168. Id. at 35.
169. Id. at 38-39.
170. Id. at 40-41.
171. Id. at 43-44.
172. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1833, 1851-52 (1992).
173. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 49.
174. Id. at 58-59.
175. Id. at 56-58.
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finding for the plaintiffs, the Court held that the district court's ap-
proach, "which tested data derived from three election years in each
district, and which revealed that blacks strongly supported black
candidates, while, to the black candidates' usual detriment, whites
rarely did, satisfactorily addresses each facet of the proper legal
standard."' 76
In the 1993 term, the Supreme Court decided two major cases
under the Thornburg test. The first, Growe v. Emison,17 involved a
single member legislative district vote dilution claim brought by mi-
nority plaintiffs in Minneapolis. 78 A unanimous Court held that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove they were geographically compact and
failed to provide statistical or anecdotal evidence of majority bloc
voting or political cohesion. 79 Thus, the plaintiffs did not meet the
requirements of Thornburg and could not prevail.
In the second case, Voinovich v. Quilter,80 a unanimous Court
once again held that the creation of single-member minority-major-
ity voting districts does not violate the Voting Rights Act because it
does not "invariably minimize or maximize minority voting
strength" (either effect was possible).' 8' The Court noted that sec-
tion 2 of the Act placed the burden of showing a state practice has
the effect of diminishing or abridging the voting strength of the pro-
tected class on the party making a vote dilution claim. 182 Further,
the Court stated that the plaintiffs did not meet the part of the
Thornburg test that requires the minority plaintiffs to show that the
white majority engages in bloc voting, and thus led to the inability
of minority voters to elect their chosen representatives. 83 Addition-
ally, there was no showing of a legislative intent to dilute African-
176. Id. at 61. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor who authored the opinion in Shaw, stated
that the Court had incorrectly adopted a proportional representation standard. Id. at 84-85
(O'Connor, J., concurring); see Yanos, supra note 122, at 1828. After the Thornburg case, voting
rights litigation increased significantly and defendants were more willing to settle. McDonald,
supra note 80, at 71.
177. 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993).
178. Id. at 1077-78.
179. Id. at 1085. The Court went on to state that evidence showing bloc voting as a "national
phenomenon" was not enough. The plaintiffs were required to show that bloc voting occurred in
Minneapolis, and had to bring forth statistical and anecdotal evidence similar to that presented by
the plaintiffs in Thornburg. Id.
180. 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
181. Id. at 1156.
182. Id. at 1156-57.




In sum, cases such as Gomillion, Wright, Whitcomb, and Mobile
illustrate that, as in most situations involving classifications based on
race, the plaintiff has the burden of proving both a discriminatory
intent and effect. In Beer, the plaintiffs failed to show a discrimina-
tory effect, 85 while the white plaintiffs in UJO, and the African-
American plaintiffs in Mobile, failed to show a discriminatory in-
tent.186 In response to the extreme burden on plaintiffs to show a
discriminatory legislative intent, Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982 to provide that a Voting Rights
Act violation could be established by proof of discriminatory results
alone. 187 Congress listed several factors, many of which were taken
from the White case, that the courts may consider when deciding
whether a plaintiff has proven the requisite discriminatory effects.' 88
The Court used an effects test to invalidate an at-large voting dis-
trict scheme in Rogers.89 In Thornburg, the Court ruled that racial
polarization was an essential element of a successful showing of dis-
criminatory effects, and held that racial polarization existed in that
case.' 90 The Growe and Voinovich cases are recent applications of
this rule.
Voting rights cases often incorporate principles developed in af-
firmative action and jury selection cases, because all three types of
cases involve classifications based on race and racial "stereo-
types."' Accordingly, the major cases in these areas will be dis-
184. Id. at 1159.
185. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). For a discussion of Beer, see supra notes 139-
44 and accompanying text.
186. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
167 (1977) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 78-80, 157-63 and accompanying text (discussing
the Mobile decision); see also supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text (discussing the UJO
decision).
187. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing the 1982 amendments and their
purposes).
188. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (listing the factors).
189. See supra note 84 (discussing Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982)).
190. See supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (discussing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986)).
191. For example, one of the reasons the Shaw Court held the way it did is because "racial
classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. [Racial gerrymanders]
reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be
judged by the color of their skin." Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993). These statements
not only seem inconsistent with prior voting rights cases, but also represent a departure from
several decades of affirmative action and jury selection cases which explicitly held that racial
classifications are necessary in certain social contexts. See infra notes 192-245 and accompanying
text (discussing many of these cases).
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cussed in the next section.
E. Affirmative Action Cases
The first time the Court addressed the affirmative action issue
was in the 1978 case of Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.'92 In this case, a plurality invalidated a minority set-aside
program for medical students at the University of California-Davis
under intermediate scrutiny,'93 but held that a person's race or
ethnicity could be considered a "plus" in the admissions process.""
Apparently, similar to the Croson'95 case, the plurality believed that
the Board of Regents of the University was not an appropriate body
to remedy societal discrimination.
Three years later, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,' 96 the Court held that
Congress could remedy prior discrimination in public building pro-
curement programs by mandating that ten percent of the federal
funds granted for such programs go to minority business enter-
prises. 9 7 The Court used language which resembled the intermedi-
ate scrutiny test used in Bakke.198 The Court believed that by enact-
ing this measure, Congress was not invidiously discriminating
against whites 199 but instead, had "recognized a pressing need to
move forward with new approaches in the continuing effort to
achieve the goal of equality of economic opportunity. 20 0
192. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion). In DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974),
the Court avoided adjudicating an affirmative action issue by holding that the case was moot. Id.
at 318-20.
193. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and White favored
using intermediate scrutiny for cases involving what they considered to be remedial or benign
discrimination. Id. at 359 (concurring in part & dissenting in part). Under this level of scrutiny,
the racial classification "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives." Id.
194. Id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by White, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
195. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion). In Croson,
the Court stated that even though "Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide
discrimination [this] does not mean that, afortior, the States and their political subdivisions are
free to decide that such remedies are appropriate." Id. at 490; see supra notes 109-11 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Croson case).
196. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
197. Id. at 472-73, 483-85. In 1976, less than one percent of all federal procurement in public
works went to minority business enterprises. Id. at 459.
198. Id. at 480 ('We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure that any
congressional program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish the objective of reme-
dying the present effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
goal."). For the language used in Bakke, see supra note 193.
199. Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 486.
200. Id. at 490. The dissent cited the Plessy dissent and argued for a purely "color-blind"
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In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,0 1 the Court invali-
dated a public school board's teacher lay-off scheme which provided
greater protection for African-American teachers than for white
teachers.20 2 The plurality applied strict scrutiny and found that cor-
recting for general societal discrimination and supplying role models
for African-American students were not sufficiently compelling gov-
ernment interests.20 The plurality noted that sometimes, innocent
parties must bear the burden of the remedy for curing racial dis-
crimination. 4 However, the Court stated that unlike other cases,
where the burden innocent individuals must suffer is diffused among
society at large, plans like the one at issue impose a more serious
injury on individuals. 0 5
The most recent affirmative action case decided by the Court was
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,20 6 where the Court upheld the
Federal Communication Commission's policy of considering minor-
ity ownership among other factors when awarding radio licenses.20 7
The Court held that enhancing broadcast diversity was an important
enough Congressional goal to pass intermediate scrutiny.20 8 Using
language similar to that in Fullilove, the Court emphasized that a
"congressionally mandated, benign race-conscious program that is
substantially related to the achievement of an important governmen-
tal interest is consistent with equal protection principles so long as it
does not impose undue burdens on nonminorities. 20 9
Constitution. Id. at 522-23 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
201. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
202. Id. at 270-73.
203. Id. at 274-76.
204. Id. at 280-81.
205. Id. at 282-83 ("Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an
existing job."); see Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979) (upholding a hiring program
designed to benefit minority workers).
206. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
207. Id. at 563-66.
208. Id. at 584. Specifically, the Court held that "the minority ownership policies are in other
relevant respects substantially related to the goal of enhancing broadcast diversity." Id.
209. Id. at 596-97. The Court emphasized that the burden on nonminorities in this context was
slight. Id. at 597. The Court reaffirmed the proposition in UJO, that "a State subject to § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 ...may 'deliberately creat[e] or preserv[e] black majorities in partic-
ular districts in order to ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5.'" Id. at 584
(quoting United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 159 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
1995]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
F. Jury Selection Cases
The 1880 case of Strauder v. West Virginia,21 was the first time
the Court had to face the disturbing problem of racial discrimina-
tion in jury selection. In Strauder, the conviction of an African-
American by an all-white jury was invalidated partly because the
defendant did not receive a fair trial by a jury of his peers. 21  After
Strauder, the Court did not address the problem of racial discrimi-
nation in jury selection until the 1965 case of Swain v. Alabama.2"2
There, although twenty-six percent of the people eligible to sit on
grand and petit juries were African-American, since 1953 only ten
to fifteen percent of the people actually selected to serve had been
African-American.21 3 Further, although an average of six to seven
African-Americans were selected to sit on jury venires, no African-
American had served on a petit jury during the previous thirteen
years.21 4
In this particular case, the defendant claimed that the prosecu-
tor's use of preemptory challenges to exclude all eight African-
Americans who made it to the petit panel violated his Equal Protec-
tion rights.215 In rejecting this argument, the Court emphasized the
historic and practical importance of the peremptory challenge.21 6
Moreover, the Court established an extremely difficult burden of
proof for defendants to meet in order to show a Constitutional viola-
tion of a prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge - the de-
fendant had to show that a particular prosecutor repeatedly ex-
cluded African-American jurors in various kinds of cases in order to
prevail in an Equal Protection claim. 217
210. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
211. Id. at 308. The West Virginia statute struck down by the Court read: "All white male
persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve
as jurors ... ." Id. at 304; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534-36 (1975) (holding
invalid a state statute which allowed women to serve on juries only if they volunteered).
212. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modi-
fied, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
213. Id. at 205.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 212-13.
217. Id. at 223-24 ("[W]hen the prosecutor . . . in case after case . . . whatever the circum-
stances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the
removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors . . . it would appear that the
purposes of the peremptory challenge are being perverted."). In Commonwealth v. Soares, 387
N.E.2d 499, 516-18 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), and People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d
748, 761-62 (Cal. 1978), state courts used state constitutions to hold that defendants need only
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Fortunately for minority criminal defendants, the Court lowered
the burden of proof years later in Batson v. Kentucky."' There, the
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four African-
Americans from the petit jury, and the defendant was subsequently
convicted. 219 The Court began its analysis by noting the difficulty
minority defendants were having in proving an Equal Protection vio-
lation under the Swain standard.2 In order to alleviate this diffi-
culty, the Court articulated a new standard whereby a defendant
only had to show racial discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges by the prosecutor in the defendant's particular case:2 '
first, the defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group; second, the defendant can presume that peremptory
challenges are devices by which a prosecutor can engage in racial
discrimination; and third, the defendant can show by relevant facts
and circumstances in his case that the prosecutor discriminated
against jurors on account of their race.22 Once the defendant makes
this prima facie showing, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecu-
tion to provide a racially neutral explanation for the exclusion. 2 In
dissent, Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, stated that a
peremptory challenge based on race is permissible because it "al-
lows the covert expression of what we dare not say but know is true
more often than not. '224
show that the prosecution discriminated against jurors in their particular case.
218. 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
219. Id. at 82-83.
220. Id. at 92-93. The Court stated that:
The lower courts have noted the practical difficulties of proving that the State system-
atically has exercised peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on ac-
count of race. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed, the defendant
would have to investigate, over a number of cases, the race of persons tried in the
particular jurisdiction, the racial composition of the venire and petit jury, and the
manner in which both parties exercised their peremptory challenges.
Id. at 92 n.17.
221. Id. at 95-97.
222. Id. at 96.
223. Id. at 97. A prosecutor's statement that he used his peremptory strikes to exclude Latino
jurors because he feared they would not accept the translator's rendition of Spanish-language
testimony, but instead would only listen to the testimony of the Spanish-speaking witnesses, was
accepted as a race-neutral explanation by the Court in Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859,
1866-68 (1991).
224. Batson, 476 U.S. at 121 (Burger, J., dissenting). The dissent, quoting Barbara Allen Bab-
cock, Voir Dire: "Preserving Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L REV. 545 (1975), stated that:
"The peremptory, made without giving any reason, avoids trafficking in the core of
truth in most common stereotypes. . . . Common human experience, common sense,
psychosociological studies, and public opinion polls tell us it is likely that certain clas-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:917
In the same year as Batson, the Court decided two other major
cases dealing with racial classifications in jury selection. The first
was Vasquez v. Hillery.225 In this case, the Court held that the sys-
tematic exclusion of grand jurors of a defendant's race was grounds
for reversible error when the defendant was ultimately convicted.2 26
The second case was Turner v. Murray,2 7 where an African-Ameri-
can was convicted of killing a white jewelry store owner and sen-
tenced to death . 2  The trial court in Turner refused the defendant's
request that he be allowed to question the prospective jurors about
their possible racial prejudice. 22 9 The Court held that because the
jury is vested with so much discretion in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial (jurors must weigh mitigating and aggravating factors),
there was, "a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but
remain undetected. ' 230 This opportunity, along with the inherent fi-
nality of the death sentence, convinced the Court that, "a capital
defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have pro-
spective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on
the issue of racial bias. 23 1
Two recent jury selection cases involved white defendants. In
ses of people statistically have predispositions that would make them inappropriate
jurors for particular kinds of cases."
Id. In Shaw, Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion which explicitly condemned the use of
racial stereotypes. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827-28, 2832 (1993). Five years after Batson,
the Court held that the standards articulated in that case apply in civil cases as well. Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
225. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
226. Id. at 264 ("Once having found discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, we simply
cannot know that the need to indict would have been assessed in the same way by a grand jury
properly constituted."). The dissent asserted that discrimination at the grand jury phase was irrel-
evant since a petit jury that did not suffer racial discrimination found the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 267 (Powell, J., dissenting). In response to this argument, the majority
stated, "even if a grand jury's determination of probable cause is confirmed in hindsight by a
conviction on the indicted offense, that confirmation in no way suggests that the discrimination did
not impermissibly infect the framing of the indictment and, consequently, the nature or very exis-
tence of the proceedings to come." Id. at 263.
227. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
228. Id. at 29.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 34-35.
231. Id. at 36-37. The Court also held that since at the guilt stage, jurors in capital cases have
no more discretion than they do in noncapital cases, defendants in noncapital cases do not have
the right to question jurors about potential racial bias. Id. (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589,
595 n.6 (1976)). Justice Marshall, in his concurrence, argued that risk of prejudice in any violent
interracial crime is so great that defendants should have the right to inquire about potential racial
prejudice. Id. at 45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Powers v. Ohio,232 a white defendant objected to the prosecution's
use of peremptory challenges to exclude seven African-American ve-
nire-persons. 33 In overturning the defendant's subsequent convic-
tion, the Court modified Batson by holding that the defendant no
longer had to prove that he was a member of a cognizable racial
group, and that the prosecution used peremptory challenges to ex-
clude members of the same group. 34 According to the Court, the
defendant simply had to show that the prosecutor excluded jurors
based on race.213 One of the reasons the Court held that the defend-
ant had standing to sue on behalf of the excluded jurors was be-
cause he was denied his right "to be tried by a jury free from eth-
nic, racial or political prejudice. '236 The Court also stated that the
decision was necessary to foster a public perception of fairness and
impartiality in the justice system. 37
In Georgia v. McCollum,2 3 three white criminal defendants ac-
cused of committing aggravated assault and battery against an Afri-
can-American couple intended to use their peremptory challenges to
exclude African-Americans from the jury.2 39 The prosecution sought
an order providing that if it could make out a prima facie case of
racial discrimination by the defense, under Batson, the defense
would then have to put forth a race-neutral explanation for the ex-
clusion. 40 The Court agreed with the prosecution. 4' Similar to its
decision in Powers, the Court emphasized the need for public confi-
dence in the criminal justice system,242 and that a criminal defend-
ant's use of peremptory challenges in this context constitutes "state
action" which violates Equal Protection. 43
232. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
233. Id. at 403.
234. Id. at 407-09.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 410-12. In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), the Court held that although a
white defendant had standing to object to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
African-Americans from the jury, he was not entitled to relief since the suit was brought under
the Sixth Amendment, rather than on Equal Protection grounds. Id. at 487 & n.3. According to
the Court, the Sixth Amendment demands an impartial jury, but not necessarily a representative
one. Id. at 480-81.
237. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410-11.
238. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
239. Id. at 2351.
240. Id. at 2351-52.
241. Id. at 2359.
242. Id. at 2354.
243. Id. at 2354-57. Justice O'Connor, author of the Shaw opinion, seemed to acknowledge the
reality of certain racial "stereotypes" in her dissent: "It is by now clear that conscious and uncon-
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To summarize, although members of the Court often assert that
the Constitution is color-blind, " many cases, such as the voting
rights, affirmative action, and jury selection cases discussed above
demonstrate that the Constitution often tolerates, and in some cases
even mandates, race-consciousness. This is particularly true when
Congress enacts legislation as a remedial measure, or when discrim-
ination affects a fundamental right such as voting or the right to a
fair trial. Often, a racially discriminatory purpose is inferred solely
from discriminatory effects.245
II. SUBJECT OPINION: SHAW V. RENO
A. Facts and Procedure
After the 1990 Census, North Carolina became entitled to a
twelfth federal congressional district.246 Pursuant to the 1965 Vot-
ing Rights Act, the state legislature submitted its new redistricting
plan to the Attorney General, who formally objected to it.2 47 The
plan contained only one African-American majority district, and
since the voting age population of the state is approximately twenty
percent African-American, the Attorney General believed a second
district should be created in order to give effective representation to
the minority population.248 In response to the Attorney General's
objection, North Carolina created a 160-mile long district which in
some areas was no wider than Highway 1-85.249
Soon after the state legislature enacted the plan, several white
scious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented
at their trials .... " Id. at 2364 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
244. See infra notes 479-607 and accompanying text (discussing the need for "race conscious-
ness" as opposed to "color-blindness" in the context of voting rights).
245. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (stating that the Voting Rights Act, as
amended in 1982, allows discriminatory effect alone to constitute sufficient evidence of racial
discrimination).
246. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (1993).
247. Id. at 2819-20; see supra note 60 (noting that most of North Carolina was covered by the
original terms of section 4 of the Voting Rights Act).
248. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. Of the remaining eighty percent of the voting age population,
approximately seventy-eight percent of the state is white, one percent is Native American and the
remainder is predominantly Asian. Id. The Attorney General formally objected to the legislature's
proposed plan, and suggested that the state could have used boundary lines, " 'no more irregular
than [those] found elsewhere in the proposed plan.' " Id. (alteration in the original) (quoting the
App. to Br. for Fed. Appellees, IOa-I Ia).
249. Id. at 2820-21. One state legislator remarked, "'if you drove down the interstate with
both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.' " Id. at 2821 (quoting Biskupic,
supra note 89, at A4).
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North Carolina residents challenged it under the Equal Protection
Clause, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional politi-
cal gerrymander. 50 Relying on Davis v. Bandemer,251 the district
court ruled that although the plaintiffs may have made a sufficient
showing of an intent to discriminate against an identifiable political
group, they had not proven a discriminatory effect.2"2 Thus, the
court found that the plan did not "shut [plaintiffs] out of the politi-
cal process, '  and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.54
Subsequently, the plaintiffs brought a new challenge against then
Attorney General, William Barr, under the Equal Protection
Clause.255
According to the district court, the plaintiffs' basic premise for
their argument was that "any state legislative redistricting driven by
considerations of race - whatever the race, whatever the specific
purpose, whatever the specific effect - is unconstitutional."25 6  The
court took judicial notice of the fact that the plaintiffs were white.2 57
In dismissing the plaintiffs' claim, the court relied primarily on the
following language in United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey
(UJO):25 8 "'compliance with the [Voting Rights] Act in reappor-
tionment cases [will] often necessitate the use of racial considera-
tions in drawing district lines.' "259 As in UJO, the court in Shaw
250. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 395 (W.D.N.C. 1992), afTd, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). The
plaintiffs included The Republican Party of North Carolina, 30 Republican voters, nine Demo-
cratic voters and three non-affiliated citizens. Id. at 394.
251. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). The Bandemer Court ruled that as in racial gerrymandering cases, a
plaintiff alleging an unconstitutional political gerrymander must "prove both intentional discrimi-
nation against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group."
Id. at 127.
252. Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 396. As the court pointed out, it is difficult to comprehend how the
plaintiffs could claim there was discrimination against an identifiable political group when the
plaintiffs themselves belonged to different political groups. Id. at 396 n.3. For purposes of the case,
the court proceeded on the assumption that the alleged discrimination was against the Republican
Party. Id.
253. Id. at 397.
254. Id. at 399. In dismissing the complaint, the majority seemed to anticipate and perhaps
even desire future proceedings: "Until we hear otherwise from a higher authority, we ... dismiss
the plaintiffs' complaint . . .with prejudice." Id.
255. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
256. Id. at 467-68.
257. Id. at 470. Prior to this, the plaintiffs only identified themselves as individuals acting on
behalf of themselves and "all other citizens and registered voters of North Carolina - whether
black, white, Native American, or others." Id. (citing Compl. 29, at 12).
258. 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion).
259. 808 F. Supp. at 470-71 (alteration in original) (quoting UJO, 430 U.S. at 159).
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believed the plaintiffs failed to prove a discriminatory intent or ef-
fect.2 60 The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that an intent to
favor African-Americans automatically constitutes an intent to in-
vidiously discriminate against whites. 26 1 Further, the court stated
that the plaintiffs failed to show how the plan had the effect of fenc-
ing the white population out of the political process, thereby mini-
mizing or canceling out their voting strength.28 2 Thus, the court con-
cluded, the plaintiffs suffered no cognizable harm and failed to state
a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.2"3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the plaintiffs' direct ap-
peal.2"4 The Court limited the appeal to the question of "whether a
state legislature's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act and
the Attorney General's interpretation thereof precludes a finding
that the legislature's congressional redistricting plan was adopted
with invidious discriminatory intent where the legislature did not ac-
cede to the plan suggested by the Attorney General but instead de-
veloped its own."128 5 The Court's response to this question represents
a major step in voting rights jurisprudence.
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
1. Historical Racial Discrimination in Voting Rights
A five member Supreme Court majority, speaking through Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, began its analysis by examining this coun-
try's history of racial discrimination in voting rights, and the major
cases adjudicated by the Court involving voting rights claims.288 The
opinion emphasized how the racial gerrymander was one "of the
weapons in the States' arsenal" designed to exclude African-Ameri-
cans from the voting process.28 7 Further, the Court noted the pro-
gress made in the area of minority voting rights after the passage of
260. Id. at 472.
261. Id. at 473.
262. Id. The court noted that the plan, "will not lead to proportional underrepresentation of
white voters on a statewide basis." Id.
263. Id. One judge agreed that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional, but
dissented from the court's holding. Id. at 475-77 (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part).
264. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 653 (1992)
(No. 92-357).
265. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 653-54.
266. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2822-23 (1993).
267. Id. at 2823. O'Connor cited the district at issue in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), as one example. Id.
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the Voting Rights Act of 1965, particularly the 1982 Amend-
ments. 68 Nevertheless, the Court stated that "[i]t is unsettling how
closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial
gerrymanders of the past. ' 269 Although the Court acknowledged
that race-conscious decision-making is not per se impermissible,
they concluded that the plaintiffs in this case could seek relief under
the Equal Protection Clause.27 °
2. Race-Conscious Classifications and Voting
Justice O'Connor next summarized race-based classifications in
Equal Protection analysis generally, and concluded that legislation
containing a race-based classification must be "narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest."27' Moreover, the Court
agreed with Appellants' contention that "redistricting legislation
that is so bizarre on its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds
272 tother than race,' demands strict scrutiny review. According to
the Court, Gomillion v. Lightfoot273 stands for the proposition that
"district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters
by race require careful scrutiny ...regardless of the motivations
underlying their adoption. 2 74 Further, the Court stated that cases
such as Wright v. Rockefeller275 illustrate the difficulty of proving a
racial gerrymander.2 76 The Court explained that one way a state
can rebut the claim that it created a voting district exclusively on
268. Id.
269. Id. at 2824.
270. Id. The plaintiffs conceded that a color-blind Constitution was an ideal, and that the
Court has never interpreted it as a literal principle of American law. See id. (stating that "despite
their invocation of the ideal of a 'color-blind' Constitution ...appellants appear to concede that
race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional") (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 16-19).
271. Id. at 2825 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) (plural-
ity opinion)). According to the Court, classifications based on race are to be avoided even if they
are remedial in nature, because they stigmatize individuals and promote racial hostility. Id. at
2824-25.
272. Id. (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977)).
273. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
274. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
275. 376 U.S. 52 (1964); see supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (discussing the facts
and holding of Wright).
276. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826. According to the Court, this is especially true since a reappor-
tionment statute doesn't classify persons, it classifies tracts of land. Id. It pointed out that al-
though legislators may be aware of race when drawing district lines just as they are aware of




racial grounds is by demonstrating it adhered to "traditional dis-
tricting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political subdivisions." 2 " In contrast, the Court stated that a district
that includes people "who are widely separated by geographical and
political boundaries" and who have little in common except their
race "bears an uncomfortable resemblance'to political apartheid. ' 278
Justice O'Connor emphasized that this kind of district fosters the
stereotype that "members of the same racial group - regardless of
[other demographic factors] . . . think alike, share the same politi-
cal interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. '2 79
According to the Court, this kind of district may also present the
danger that the district's elected representatives may see their func-
tion as representing only their racial group's interests instead of the
interests of the entire community. 80 Thus, the Court held that the
plaintiffs stated a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 81
3. Rebutting the Dissenters
The Court then attacked the positions of the various dissenters.282
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the dissenters correctly pointed
out that in other districting schemes, such as at-large and multi-
member plans, the Court has required the plaintiff to prove discrim-
inatory intent and effect. 283 However, she stated that these schemes
are different than the one at issue because they do not classify vot-
ers on the basis of race.284 The majority also responded to Justice
Stevens' argument in his dissent that there is no constitutional viola-
tion when district lines favor the minority. 88 The Court rebutted
Justice Stevens' argument by stating that "equal protection analysis
'is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a
277. Id. at 2827. The Court seemed to contend that one way to tell if a legislature complied
with these standards is by simply looking at the shape of the district. The Court stated, "reappor-




281. Id. at 2828.
282. Id. at 2828-30.
283. Id. at 2828.
284. Id. The Court also responded to the argument of the dissenters that the district at issue is
no different from political gerrymanders by stating that, "nothing in our case law compels the
conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional
scrutiny." Id. In addition, it stated that the highest scrutiny is traditionally reserved for racial
classifications. Id.
285. Id. at 2829.
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particular classification.' "286 The Court distinguished the UJO case
by stating that the plaintiffs in that case did not and could not al-
lege that the district was so bizarre on its face that it could only be
explained as an attempt to classify voters based on race.287 The dis-
trict in Shaw, according to the majority, "immediately offends prin-
ciples of racial equality" and is thus subject to a different
analysis. 88
Justice Souter, in dissent, asserted that since redistricting always
requires legitimate considerations of race, racial gerrymanders
should be subject to a relaxed form of judicial review as long as
racial bloc voting takes place. 89 The Court rejected this argument
by stating that racial bloc voting "specifically must be proved in
each case."2 90 Justice O'Connor perceived Justice Souter's state-
ments as classifying the redistricting scheme at issue as a benign
form of discrimination, but conceded that it should be subject to
strict scrutiny anyway because "a court cannot determine whether
or not the discrimination truly is 'benign.' "291
The state asserted that it created the district because it had a
compelling interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act.292 In
rejecting this contention, the Court stated that, "courts must bear in
mind the difference between what the law permits, and what it re-
quires. ' 293 For instance, in UJO, the plaintiffs failed to show that
the state went beyond what was necessary to avoid retrogression as
286. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality
opinion)). The Court went on to state that Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991), stands for
the proposition that, "racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to
burden or benefit the races equally." Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 2829-30 (asserting that "[n]othing in the [UJOI decision precludes white voters (or
voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate
voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification").
289. Id. at 2845-47 (Souter, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 2830 (citing Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1076 (1993)).
291. Id. The Court concluded that the state must demonstrate that it had a compelling interest
in creating the district at issue. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. As an example, the Court stated that on remand the state may assert that it created
the district in order to comply with the nonretrogression principle announced in Beer v. United
States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976), where the Court held that a districting plan was valid under
section 5 because it improved the position of minorities. Id. However, the Court made it clear that
the Beer Court declined to hold that the scheme was not subject to constitutional challenge. Id. at
2830-31. Further, the Court asserted that the Voting Rights Act and precedent plainly indicate
that a plan which is not invalid under section 5 may still be held unconstitutional under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c. Id. at 2831.
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required by Beer v. United States.294 Therefore, if a state did go
beyond what was reasonably necessary, its plan "would not be nar-
rowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression."29
4. Rejection of the State's "Compelling Interests"
Rather than asserting that the revised districting plan was neces-
sary to prevent retrogression, the state Appellees contended that the
North Carolina legislature created the district to avoid section 2's
prohibition against dilution of African-American voting strength
under the principles announced in Thornburg v. Gingles.2 96 The Ap-
pellants responded by stating that since the African-American popu-
lation is so widely dispersed throughout the state, it is not geograph-
ically compact enough to pass muster under the Thornburg test.2 97
Further, they argued that there was no evidence of African-Ameri-
can political cohesion in North Carolina, and demonstrated that
whites were willing to vote for African-Americans.2 98 The Court
held that these issues "need not be decided in this stage of the liti-
gation" and remained open for consideration on remand.299
In conclusion, the Court emphasized the evils of racial classifica-
tions generally.3"' Justice O'Connor was especially critical of racial
gerrymanders because they "may balkanize us into competing racial
factions" and threaten "to carry us further from the goal of a politi-
cal system in which race no longer matters."30 1 Finally, the Court
expressed no view on whether the Appellants could have successfully
294. Id. (citing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 162-63 (1977)).
295. Id.
296. Id. Additionally, the state argued that North Carolina had a compelling interest in eradi-
cating the effects of past racial discrimination entirely independent from any obligations under tie
Voting Rights Act. Id. The state brought forth evidence of pervasive state-sponsored racial dis-
crimination in North Carolina, as well as studies showing racial bloc voting. Id. at 2831-32; see
also supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (discussing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986)).
297. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831.
298. Id. The Appellants pointed out that the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Repre-
sentatives, state Auditor, and chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections were African-
American. Id.
299. Id. at 2832. The Court did point out that in UJO, "only three Justices ... were prepared
to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting
apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act." Id. (citing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1977)).
300. Id. ("They reinforce the belief held by too many for too much of our history, that individ-




challenged a district created in another part of the state.302
C. Justice White's Dissent
1. Use of the Traditional Intent and Effects Test
Justice White, who wrote the plurality opinion in UJO, relied pri-
marily on that case to write a stern dissent. Justice White believed
there was no basis for the Appellants' claim because they had not
alleged a cognizable injury.30 3 He analogized this case to UJO,
where five Justices held that the plaintiffs in that case likewise had
not alleged a cognizable injury because they could not show that the
legislation was intended, or had the effect of, minimizing their
group's voting strength. 30 4 According to Justice White, it is not re-
markable to observe that legislators routinely consider race when
making redistricting decisions.30 5 Since legislators typically consider
race, the Court's decisions have required an identifiable group to
show more than "mere lack of success at the polls,"30 6 but rather
that "'the political processes . . . were not equally open to partici-
pation by the group in question.' "1307 Justice White further stated
that, "it is not mere suffering at the polls but discrimination in the
polity with which the Constitution is concerned. ' 30 8
2. The Court's Misreading of Precedent
According to Justice White, since the plaintiffs in UJO could not
show how the white vote was unfairly minimized, they did not have
a valid Fourteenth Amendment claim. 30 9 Like New York (the state
Appellee in UJO), the Voting Rights Act covers several of North
302. Id.
303. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White believes that plaintiffs can suffer consti-
tutional violations of their right to vote in one of two ways: first, by an outright prohibition on the
right to vote (for example through the use of a poll tax); and second, through the intentional
dilution of a group's voting strength. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 2834-35.
306. Id. at 2835 (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 153-55 (1971)).
307. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting White, 412 U.S. at 766).
308. Id. Justice White compared the district at hand to political gerrymanders where the ques-
tion is "'whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively
influence the political process.' " Id. at 2386 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-33
(1986)). He also remarked that although Davis involved a political gerrymander, the principles
relied upon by the Court in that case came from the racial gerrymandering cases. Id. at 2836 n.3.
309. Id. at 2837 (citing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977)).
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Carolina's political subdivisions because North Carolina has a his-
tory of racial discrimination in voting. 10 In both cases, the Attorney
General objected to the states' original plans and ordered them to
create new ones.311 With these facts in mind, Justice White asserted
that it "strain[ed] credulity" to believe the North Carolina legisla-
ture intended to discriminate against members of the majority
group.3 12 Justice White added that even if the Appellants could
somehow show a discriminatory intent, the redistricting plan cer-
tainly did not produce any discriminatory effects given that even
under the rejected plan, the seventy-eight percent white population
would have held eighty-three percent of the congressional
districts.31a
3. The Majority's Approach "Makes No Sense"
Justice White further argued that the majority had no foundation
for distinguishing UJO and stated that "race-conscious redistricting
that 'segregates' by drawing odd-shaped lines is qualitatively differ-
ent from race-conscious districting that affects groups in some other
way." 314  Justice White also admonished that the Court mis-
characterized Gomillion v. Lightfoot,"' as a segregation case. 1 6 In
reality, Justice White made clear, Gomillion focused on the uncon-
stitutional effect of the legislation which was " 'to deprive the Negro
petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of residence in Tus-
kegee.' ,317 The majority's invocation of Wright v. Rockefeller,31 8
was also puzzling to Justice White. He stated, "I fail to see how a
310. Id.
311. Id. at 2837-38.
312. Id. at 2838. Justice White also noted that "[t]he State has made no mystery of its intent,
which was to respond to the Attorney General's objections ... by improving the minority group's
prospects of electing a candidate of its choice." Id.
313. Id. Under the new plan, whites would have held 10 (83%) of the state's 12 congressional
districts. Id.
314. Id. White stated that the plaintiffs in this case, as did the plaintiffs in UJO, brought forth
a claim that the state intentionally created a district along racial lines. Id. at 2838-39. He asserted
that this argument was rejected in UJO. Id. at 2839.
315. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
316. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838-39 (White, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 2839 (quoting Gomillion. 364 U.S. at 341). "In Gomillion, in short, the group that
formed the majority at the state level purportedly set out to manipulate city boundaries in order to
remove members of the minority, thereby denying them valuable municipal services." Id. Justice
White also cited Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971), and United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968), as interpreting Gomillion as turning on the unconstitutional effect of
the legislation. Id.
318. 376 U.S. 339 (1960).
954 [Vol. 44:917
SHAW v. RENO
decision based on a failure to establish discriminatory intent can
support the inference that it is unnecessary to prove discriminatory
effect."3 19
In Justice White's words, the majority's approach to this case
"makes no sense."320 Justice White believed it was illogical to sug-
gest that an unusually-shaped gerrymander is somehow more harm-
ful than a different kind of racial gerrymander, and thus subject to
a higher level of review. 21 According to Justice White, although
"district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a potential ger-
rymander, they do no more than that."3 2 Justice White believed it
was a mistake to focus on the district's appearance rather than its
effect, 3  and was troubled that the decision "will unnecessarily hin-
der to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of
minority representation." 24
4. Compelling Interests
Justice White went on to say that even if this plan was subject to
strict scrutiny review, a state's compliance with the Voting Rights
Act is certainly a compelling interest.3 25 Although the Court ac-
knowledged that the state is permitted to create a second majority-
minority district to give effective representation to its African-
American population, it held that the current plan is not narrowly
tailored to further the state's interest in complying with the law. 26
Justice White believed the current plan was narrowly tailored, and
was uncertain how the Court would manage this standard in the
future.32 7 In conclusion, Justice White noted that efforts to remedy
319. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2839. White believed that Wright was only relevant to show that
under certain circumstances, a complaint alleging that a race-based districting scheme is grounds
for relief under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2839-40.
320. Id. at 2840.
321. Id. White was also troubled by the majority's use of the term "segregation" to describe
the district at issue since 54.7% of the district is African-American, and no racial group can be
said to have been "set-apart" or "isolated." Id. at 2840 n.7 (citations omitted).
322. Id. at 2841. Justice White was perplexed by the majority's concession that " 'compactness
.has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for state
legislative districts.'" Id. (quoting Gaffney v. Commings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973)). He
believed the shape of a district in and of itself had no bearing on whether it violated the Constitu-
tion. Id. (footnote omitted).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 2842.
326. Id.
327. Id. As an illustration of the difficulty in managing this standard, White offered the
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minority vote dilution differ from affirmative action programs in
that they are not preferential treatment, but rather an attempt to
equalize treatment.328
D. Justice Blackmun's Dissent
Justice Blackmun wrote a short dissent in which he agreed with
Justice White's view that the Appellants failed to prove a discrimi-
natory intent or effect, and stressed the irony that the Court had
struck down a redistricting plan under which North Carolina sent
African-Americans to Congress for the first time since
Reconstruction. 29
E. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice White's dissent but wrote sep-
arately to point out that the majority wasted their time trying to
prove two undisputed facts: first, that the North Carolina legislature
obviously created the district to favor or disfavor an identifiable
group of voters, and, second, that they created it so that African-
American voters would have an opportunity to elect an African-
American representative.330 According to Justice Stevens, the only
real issue in the case was whether the Constitution imposes a re-
quirement on the states to create only contiguous and compact dis-
tricts, or prevents them from creating such a district in order to
facilitate the election of a member of an identifiable racial group.",
He pointed out that the majority conceded that the Constitution
does not itself require compactness in creating districts. 832 Justice
following:
Is it more "narrowly tailored" to create an irregular majority-minority district as op-
posed to one that is compact but harms other state interests such as incumbency pro-
tection or the representation of rural interests? Of the following two options -- crea-
tion of two minority influence districts or of a single majority-minority district - is
one "narrowly tailored" and the other not? Once the Attorney General has found that
a proposed redistricting change violates § 5's nonretrogression principle in that it will
abridge a racial minority's right to vote, does "narrow tailoring" mean that the most
the state can do is preserve the status quo? Or can it maintain that change, while
attempting to enhance minority voting power in some other manner?
Id.
328. Id. at 2843.
329. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
330. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
331. Id.
332. Id. The Court stated: "We emphasize that (traditional districting principles such as such
as compactness and contiguity] ...are important not because they are constitutionally required
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Stevens believed, therefore, that when a majority group creates un-
usually-shaped districts to aid a minority group, the majority does
not violate the Constitution.333 Since politicians frequently make as-
sumptions as to how particular groups will vote, "when an assump-
tion that people in [a] particular a [sic] minority group . . . will
vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitu-
tional violation occurs. 334 In conclusion, Justice Stevens argued
that since it is permissible for legislators to draw boundary lines to
favor groups such as political parties, union members and other eth-
nic groups, "it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the
same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in
the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. '335
F. Justice Souter's Dissent
1. Race-Consciousness in Districting is Different
According to Justice Souter, unlike other contexts in which the
Court has analyzed race-conscious decision making, 336  decisions
concerning electoral districting almost always require the legitimate
consideration of race.337 For Justice Souter, as long as the Court can
discuss concepts such as "minority voting strength" and "dilution of
minority votes," and racial bloc voting takes place, legislators will
be compelled to take race into account in these situations. 3 8 Justice
- they are not'. . . - but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim
that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines." Id. at 2827 (citations omitted). Like
Justice White, Justice Stevens believed that, "Ithe existence of bizarre and uncouth district
boundaries is powerful evidence of an ulterior purpose behind the shaping of those boundaries."
Id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 2844. Justice Stevens cited the districts at issue in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725
(1983), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), as examples of impermissible gerryman-
ders. Id.
334. Id. At this point, Justice Stevens noted that the second and third prongs of the Thornburg
test required plaintiffs to prove what the majority labeled "'impermissible racial stereotypes.'"
Id. at 2844 n.3 (quoting Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)).
335. Id. at 2844-45. Justice Stevens believed that the Court's opinion may mean that African-
Americans are the only group which cannot benefit from redistricting, even though it was once
believed that African-Americans were the only group protected under the Equal Protection Clause
in this context. Id. at 2845 n.4 (citations omitted).
336. Id. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting). As examples, Justice Souter cited City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion), and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion). Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) as discussing these concepts). Addi-
tionally, he stated that the Court was mistaken in calling the phenomenon of racial bloc voting a
racial stereotype. Id. at 2845 n.2.
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Souter stated that another reason why race-conscious redistricting is
different from other contexts, such as affirmative action, is because
in the latter context, a benefit to a member of one race is at the
obvious expense of a member of another. 3 9 In redistricting, Justice
Souter believed, "the mere placement of an individual in one district
instead of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to
others."34 He also emphasized that "dilution" refers to the effects
on a group's voting power, not an individual's.3 4 1
In Justice Souter's view, the Court has analyzed race-conscious
redistricting cases differently from other cases involving a state's use
of race in making decisions.34 2 He pointed out that in the race-based
redistricting context, prior cases indicate that instead of using a
traditional Fourteenth Amendment analysis, it is more appropriate
to examine the effects of the redistricting legislation. 43 Thus, ac-
cording to Justice Souter, once the Court identifies an impermissible
result like vote dilution, the redistricting plan is automatically viola-
tive of the Fourteenth Amendment and requires no further scru-
tiny.344 Justice Souter did not see an inconsistency in having a sepa-
rate test for racial redistricting, nor did he consider the test a form
of "benign" discrimination. 45
339. Id. at 2846.
340. Id. (footnote omitted). To support this statement, Justice Souter stated that: "All citizens
may register, vote, and be represented. In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote
in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation." Id. Further, Justice
Souter asserted that the majority's use of the word "segregation" was inappropriate in this context
since the word is normally used to describe school segregation and other similar contexts where
inequality of facilities and/or opportunities is the typical result. Id. at 2846 n.4 (citations
omitted).
341. Id. (citations omitted).
342. Id. at 2846-47. Justice Souter stated that in non-redistricting cases, every member of the
Court has agreed that, at a minimum, heightened scrutiny is the proper level of review. Id.
343. Id. "[T]he purpose and effect of the districting must be to devalue the effectiveness of a
voter compared to what, as a group member, he would otherwise be able to enjoy." Id. (citing
United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1977) (plurality opinion)). Justice
Souter thus agreed with Justice White that it would be difficult for the white plaintiffs to show
that their, "opportunity to participate equally in the North Carolina's electoral process has been
unconstitutionally diminished." Id. at 2847 n.6.
344. Id. at 2847.
345. Id. at 2848. In response to the majority's suggestion that he believed the use of race in
redistricting was a "benign" form of discrimination, Justice Souter stated that,
in electoral districting there frequently are permissible uses of race, such as its use to
comply with the Voting Rights Act, as well as impermissible ones. In determining
whether a use of race is permissible in cases in which there is a bizarrely-shaped
district, we can readily look to its effects, just as we would in evaluating any other
electoral districting scheme.
Id. at 2848 n.7.
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2. Nothing Inherently Wrong With "Bizarre" Districts
In Justice Souter's opinion, there is no reason to treat unusually-
shaped districts differently from other districts."s 6 He repeated the
majority's and Justice White's observation that the Constitution
does not require "'sound districting principles.' "347 In summary,
Justice Souter "would not respond to the seeming egregiousness of
the redistricting now before us by untethering the concept of racial
gerrymander in such a case from the concept of harm exemplified
by dilution. '"348
III. ANALYSIS
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed thirty years ago, and
although many forms of private racial discrimination began to be
eliminated around that time,3 49 racial discrimination continues to
play a significant role in contemporary American society. 350 When
analyzing any Supreme Court opinion involving race, especially
when it concerns something as fundamental to our democratic sys-
tem as voting rights,3 5' one must make every effort to separate the
ideal from the reality. The Supreme Court cannot continue to ac-
knowledge the fact that our Constitution and society are not color-
blind,35 while reaching conclusions in cases like Shaw which
strongly imply that they are. Ignoring racial divisions in our society
will not make them go away. At some point, the Court must discon-
346. Id.
347. Id. at 2848-49 (quoting UJO, 430 U.S. at 168). Further, Justice Souter was not persuaded
by the majority's view that the district would cause stigmatic harm and went against the Ameri-
can system of democracy. Id. at 2848 n.9. He stated it was implausible that the district gave the
plaintiffs a sense of inferiority, and believed that representational democracy was actually en-
hanced. Id.
348. Id. at 2849.
349. See HOWARD J. ANDERSON & MICHAEL D. LEVIN-EPSTEIN, PRIMER OF EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY 3-9 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing various acts, statutes, regulations, and execu-
tive orders initiated during the 1960's that were designed to eliminate racial discrimination in
employment); Lucius J. BARKER & TWILEY W. BARKER, JR., CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 387-94 (6th ed. 1990) (discussing the impact of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act on
racial discrimination in employment); PAUL BIRSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS & POLITICS 69-96
(1985) (discussing the Civil Rights movement which sought to bring an end to discrimination in
education, employment, housing, and public accommodation).
350. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of
Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325 (1992) (discussing the continuing impact of racial discrimina-
tion in various American contexts including employment, housing and higher education).
351. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that
voting is a fundamental right).
352. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
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tinue the practice of examining racial issues in a vacuum and, as it
did in Brown v. Board of Education,353 play a more active role in
dealing with the reality that "we are far from a color-blind
society. 354
A. The Court's Opinion is Inconsistent With Precedent
1. What If the District Was Never Created At All?
Racial gerrymandering is unquestionably an uncertain and con-
troversial area of the law. Over the years, the Court's opinions have
sometimes reached different conclusions in virtually identical factual
situations.,5 5 The Shaw opinion is unusual because, given that the
plaintiffs could not possibly argue that their voting strength was di-
luted, 5 ' and this was the only way they could have prevailed under
Thornburg v. Gingles,a57 the Court chose to apply a strict scrutiny
analysis after concluding the district was "unexplainable on grounds
other than race. ' 358 This prompted at least one scholar to assert that
the Court in effect made it easier for whites to receive a remedy
under the Voting Rights Act than for African-Americans. 59
However, in fairness, the Court's opinion should not be inter-
preted this way since one must assume that if an unusually-shaped
district was created to aid white voters, the same analysis would
apply. Nevertheless, the Court explicitly chose not to analyze the
353. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is doubtful that anyone would seriously argue that overt racial
discrimination today is as serious a problem as it was when Brown was decided. Nevertheless, this
author believes that one of the reasons our society has made progress in the area is because of the
Court's willingness in cases like Brown to take meaningful steps to eliminate racism.
354. Aleinikoff, supra note 350, at 330. "The belief that Americans are approaching a color
and creed-blind society is easily disabused by the ethnic image data collected [in an extensive
1990 survey]." Id. at n.16 (quoting TOM W. SMITH. NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER. UNI-
VERSITY OF CHICAGO. ETHNIC IMAGES. GSS TOPICAL REPORT No. 19 at 4 (1990)).
355. For example, the Court in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), used a discriminatory
intent test to uphold an at-large voting scheme which had the effect of severely curtailing African-
American voting strength. Id. at 65-74. Two years later, the Court struck down a similar scheme
in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982).
356. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993).
357. See supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of
Thornburg).
358. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825; see supra notes 91-111 and accompanying text (describing the
Court's analysis for race-based classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment generally).
359. "'The Supreme Court discovered an entirely new constitutional right for white voters,
entirely new. . . . Unlike black voters, all these white voters had to show was that the district had
an odd and irregular shape.' " Thomas B. Edsall, Guinier Raps Ruling On Remap; Justices Said
to Create New Right for Whites, WASH. POST. July 14, 1993, at A3. (quoting Lani Guinier, a law
professor at the University of Pennsylvania, during a speech at the NAACP annual convention).
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case under the principles announced in Thornburge6 because the
issue of vote dilution was not developed by the lower court. 36' The
problem is that if the plaintiffs did attempt to argue a vote dilution
claim under Thornburg, they almost certainly would not have sur-
vived a motion to dismiss since their voting strength was not diluted
by the plan. Further, if the unusually-shaped district was not cre-
ated at all and African-American plaintiffs brought suit, under
Thornburg the Court would be compelled to order the creation of a
majority-minority district.36 2 Thus, the Shaw case stands for the
strange proposition that African-American voters are better off if
the state does nothing, rather than if the state takes affirmative, al-
beit drastic steps, to eliminate dilution of minority voting power.
Many commentators believed that the major racial gerrymander-
ing issues were settled in the Court's 1986 Thornburg v. Gingles363
case."6 4 In that case, the Court emphasized that under section 2 of
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, minority plaintiffs were not required to
show discriminatory intent, but could sustain a claim by simply
proving that their group suffers from vote dilution.36 5 Under Thorn-
burg, the plaintiffs must show three main conditions: first, that the
minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district"; second, that the
group is "politically cohesive"; and third, that "the white majority
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ...usually to defeat the
360. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
361. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831.
362. In a recent case, the Court emphasized that "the federal courts may not order the creation
of majority-minority districts unless necessary to remedy a violation of federal law." Voinovich v.
Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993). In the Shaw case, the Court implied that, while North
Carolina's creation of an unusually-shaped district is a violation of federal law, the absence of a
majority-minority district in the state may not have been. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830 (stating that
"in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference
between what the law permits, and what it requires").
363. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
364. See, e.g., BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR
VOTING EQUALITY 47 (1992) (discussing how the Thornburg case "shed light on all the major
issues, including the role of racial bloc voting in a vote dilution suit"); Issacharoff, supra note 172,
at 1850-53 (discussing how the Thornburg case made polarized voting the critical element of a
minority plaintiff's vote dilution claim).
365. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 43-51. Of course, according to the 1982 Amendments to Act,
evidence of racially polarized voting was only one (although probably the most significant) way of
proving racial discrimination in voting. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (listing some of
the factors a court can analyze in determining whether a violation of the Act has taken place).
One of the factors is the extent of historical racial discrimination in the geographic area. Thorn-
burg, 478 U.S. at 39. For a historical background of African-American voting rights in North
Carolina, see supra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
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minority's preferred candidate."36 The amount of racial bloc voting
necessary to sustain a claim will vary from district to district based
on a number of factors,367 and this phenomenon is easier to prove if
it occurs over a period of time. 36 8 In Shaw, the state Appellees' cited
Thornburg for the argument that the state explicitly took race into
account in order to foster an equal opportunity for African-Ameri-
can and white voters to elect candidates of their choice. 369
Assuming the district was never created at all, African-American
voters in North Carolina would have easily met the second and third
conditions. The Shaw majority proclaimed that these issues, "need
not be decided in this stage of the litigation. ' 37 0 In fact, it would
have been repetitive to decide these issues at this time since in
Thornburg, a case which also came out of North Carolina, the
Court explicitly held that African-Americans in North Carolina
were politically cohesive and noted that, "a substantial majority of
white voters would rarely, if ever, vote for a black candidate."31 71
African-American voters in North Carolina overwhelmingly sup-
ported African-American candidates, while whites usually disfa-
vored them. 72 The Court accepted the district court's findings that
white voting practices would usually result in the defeat of African-
American candidates based on two main facts. 373 First, African-
366. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
367. Id. at 56-57. The factors include:
the nature of the allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism; the presence or absence of
other potentially dilutive electoral devices, such as majority vote requirements, . . .
the percentage of registered voters in the district who are members of the minority
group; the size of the district; and, in multi-member districts, the number of seats
open and the number of candidates in the field.
Id. at 56.
368. Id. at 57.
369. Brief for the state Appellees at 32, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357).
370. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
371. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 58-59. The Court's statements were based on the findings of the
district court in the context of discussing the several multi-member state legislative voting districts
at issue in that case. Based on the court's extensive discussion of North Carolina's history of
blatant state-sponsored racial discrimination against African-American voters and the fact that,
"within all the ... districts racially polarized voting exists in a persistent and severe degree", one
must assume that racial polarization is not a phenomenon unique to these particular districts.
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 359-367 (E.D.N.C. 1984), a ffd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
372. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 60. Specifically, in 11 of the 16 elections studied, between 71% to
92% of African-American voters voted for African-American candidates. Id. at 59. In all of the
primaries studied, only 8% to 50% of white voters voted for African-Americans. Id. Nearly 82%
of the whites never voted for any African-American during these elections. Id.
373. Id.
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Americans in North Carolina have had extremely limited success in
electing candidates of their choice. 74 Second, when African-Ameri-
cans did win elections, the victories were attributed to other factors
besides the absence of polarized voting. 375
Other evidence shows that African-Americans are politically co-
hesive in North Carolina, and the voting strength of whites usually
operates to defeat the minority-supported candidates. Although the
state is roughly twenty-two percent African-American, before 1990
no African-American from North Carolina had served in Congress
since Reconstruction.3 76 When two majority-African-American dis-
tricts were created for the 1990 congressional elections, each district
elected an African-American representative.377 This is consistent
with the historical voting practices of North Carolina. Out of 120
members of the North Carolina House of Representatives, only two
to four African-Americans served between the years 1971 and
1982.378 The state Senate, which consists of fifty members, had only
one or two African-American members at any one time between the
years 1975 and 1983.71 During House Judiciary subcommittee
hearings, Kenneth Spaulding, an African-American who ran for
Congressional office in 1984, gave testimony concerning, "his failed
attempt to run a 'color blind' campaign and 'garner white votes as
well as black votes' in a district that was sixty-five percent white
and thirty-five percent black."380 He went on to state, " 'As I cam-
paigned across the district, it became clearer and clearer that no one
person could eradicate the "race consciousness" that existed in the
very fabric of people's daily lives.' ",381 As recently as 1990, a white
374. Id.
375. Id. In some cases the African-American candidate for all practical purposes ran unop-
posed, and in others two white candidates ran for three seats. Id. at 60 n.29.
376. Glasser, supra note 24.
377. Id.
378. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 365 (E.D.N.C. 1984), afid in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
379. Id. Additionally, in 1984 African-Americans held 9% of the larger city council seats,
7.3% of county commission seats, and 4% of the sheriff's offices. Id.
380. Ellen J. Silberman, Shaw v. Reno Attacked at Voting Rights Hearing, STATES NEws
SERv.. Oct. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (quoting Kenneth
Spaulding).
381. Id. Spaulding lost the election with 48% of the vote. Melvin Watt, the current representa-
tive from the disputed district said at the hearings that he was certain many African-Americans
would have "'ably served in Congress but for the fact that their skins happened to be black.' " Id.
Watt added, " 1 don't believe I could have won in [a district that was 23 % African-American]. I
certainly hope [such as thing could happen] sometime during the life of my children." Tim Cur-
ran, Chair of Civil Rights Panel Attacks Court's Shaw Decision on Race-Based Redistricting,
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candidate defeated an African-American in an election for a United
States Senate seat.38 2 Thus, African-Americans would have had lit-
tle difficulty in meeting prongs two and three of the Thornburg
test.383
If the district was never created at all, and African-Americans
brought suit, the only real issue would have been whether the Afri-
can-American voters could have shown they were "sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district. ' 384 In Thornburg, the Court did not expressly de-
fine what this condition meant.38 5 However, several lower court deci-
sions have shed light on the issue. Most courts agree that a group
must first show that its voting age population is sufficiently large to
constitute a majority in a district.3 16 Since the African-American
voting population in the disputed Twelfth District is 53.34%,387 this
first requirement would have easily been met. For obvious reasons,
showing the African-American population is geographically com-
pact would present a greater challenge. The Appellants in Shaw
ROLL CALL. Oct. 18, 1993 available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (quoting Representative
Melvin Watt, a panelist at a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing on civil and constitutional
rights). Representative Don Edwards who chairs the House Judiciary subcommittee on civil and
constitutional rights stated that the majority in Shaw was, "being 'hostile' to the Voting Rights
Act." Id.
382. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993). In 1982, H.M. (Mickey) Michaux, an Afri-
can-American who won more than ninety-five percent of the African-American votes in his dis-
trict, lost to Tim Valentine, a white man, who won over 95% of the white votes. Bernard
Grofman, High Court Ruling Won't Doom Racial Gerrymandering, CHI. TRIB., July 9, 1993, § 1,
at 19 [hereinafter Grofman, High Court Ruling]; William Simpson, Note, The Primary Runoff:
Racism's Reprive?, 65 N.C. L. REV. 359, 360 (1987).
383. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the holdings in the two most recent Supreme
Court cases on voting rights before Shaw. In Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993), a case
originating in Ohio, the Court accepted the district court's finding that since African-Americans
"have been repeatedly elected from districts with only a 35% black population," the plaintiffs
failed to show the existence of racial bloc voting. Id. at 1154; see supra notes 180-84 and accom-
panying text (giving a more detailed summary of the facts and holding in the Voinovich case).
Similarly, in Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993), a case originating in Minnesota, the Court
noted that the record contained absolutely no statistical or anecdotal evidence of minority political
cohesion in Minneapolis. Id. at 1085; see supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (giving a
more detailed summary of the facts and holding in the Growe case).
384. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
385. See GROFMAN. supra note 364, at 62-66 (discussing lower court interpretations of this
prong of the Thornburg test).
386. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 62-63 (citing Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F.2d 1012, 1018
(l1th Cir. 1990), Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989), McNeil v.
Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 944 (7th Cir. 1988), and McDaniels v. Mehfoud, 702 F.
Supp. 588 (E.D. Va. 1988)).
387. Brief for the state Appellees at 24a, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357).
The total white voting population in the district is 45.21%. Id.
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contended that the bizarre shape of the Twelfth District is evidence
that the African-American population in North Carolina is too
widely dispersed to support a geographically compact district.3 88
Nevertheless, according to at least one expert, before Shaw, the
courts generally held that, "if the plaintiffs are able to draw a (con-
tiguous) plan in which they comprise a majority in at least one dis-
trict, then they have met the first prong [of the Thornburg test],
regardless of the shape of the district. 389 Most discussions of com-
pactness are found in district court opinions, and before Shaw, a
common theme in most of them was that the shape of the district
was not significant as long as the district, "maintains a natural sense
of community. ' 390 Despite its odd shape, North Carolina's twelfth
district was fully contiguous, and there was no indication that the
majority of its constituents did not consider themselves part of the
same community.3 1 Further, as two dissenters in Shaw pointed out
and the majority conceded, "compactness or attractiveness has never
been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional re-
quirement for state legislative districts. ' 392 Therefore, although the
Shaw majority devotes much of its argument to a discussion of the
"bizarre" shape of the district, 93 this fact alone is of no constitu-
tional significance.
Considering the above facts, it is quite possible that if the state
legislature had never created a second minority-majority district,
under Thornburg, the Court would have reached the conclusion that
racial polarization exists in North Carolina. Further, the Court may
have held that the creation of an unusually-shaped district was nec-
essary to remedy this problem. Of course, it is even more possible
that the Court would have simply ordered the creation of a second
district somewhere. in the state, without specifying a particular
388. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993).
389. GROFMAN, supra note 364, at 64.
390. Id. at 64-65 (citing East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Dev. v. Parish of Jeffer-
son, 691 F. Supp. 991, 1007 (E.D. La. 1988), af'd, 926 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1991)); see also
Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1465 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (stating that
"by compactness, Thornburg does not mean that a proposed district must meet, or attempt to
achieve, some aesthetic absolute, such as symmetry or attractiveness"); Neal v. Coleburn, 689 F.
Supp. 1426, 1437 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding the majority-minority districts at issue were, "not
unreasonably irregular in shape, given the population dispersal within the County and the need to
create majority black districts").
391. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2833 app.
392. Id. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18
(1973)); accord id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
393. Id. at 2825, 2831.
1995]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:917
shape or location. 94 On remand, the district court had the option of
deciding this way. 9 ' It is clear that a geographically compact dis-
trict could be created in the south-central to southeastern part of
the state. 96 Since there was a good chance the state legislature
would have had to draw a second majority-African-American dis-
trict even if the current one was never created, one must wonder
why the location or appearance of the district makes so much differ-
ence.3 97 It is too easy to say there is something inherently improper
with a district that appears "bizarre." Similar to the way most con-
gressional districts throughout the country are currently, and have
historically been drawn, none of the congressional districts in North
Carolina are even close to perfect squares.3 98 Undoubtedly, political
reasons account for the shape of many of these districts, and it is
illogical to hold that a different standard should apply to these dis-
tricts than to race-based ones. 99
394. The Attorney General does not have the statutory authority to mandate a particular redis-
tricting plan, and it is also unlikely that the Court would order the enactment of a specific plan.
Brief for the state Appellees at 9 n.9, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357). In
Voinovich. the Court stated:
federal courts may not order the creation of majority-minority districts unless neces-
sary to remedy a violation of federal law. But that does not mean that the State's
powers are similarly limited. Quite the opposite is true: federal courts are barred from
intervening in state apportionment in the absence of a violation of federal law pre-
cisely because it is the domain of the States, and not the federal courts, to conduct
apportionment in the first place.
Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993) (citation omitted).
395. Instead, on remand the district court simply held that although the district is considered a
racial gerrymander under Shaw, the redistricting plan is not unconstitutional, "because it is nar-
rowly tailored to further the state's compelling interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act."
Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 417 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
396. In fact, when the original state redistricting plan was rejected by the Attorney General, it
was suggested that a second African-American majority district could have been created in the
south-central to southeastern part of the state, instead of in the north-central region where the
unusually-shaped district was actually drawn. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney
General of the United States to Tiare B. Smiley, Esq., Special Deputy Attorney General of North
Carolina, in Brief for the State Appellees at 16a, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-
357). The Attorney General believed that the state legislature could have created a district in this
area that would have appeared no more unusual than other districts in the plan. Id. Further,
several groups including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), submitted feasible plans for the creation
of a second district in this area. Id. at 17a.
397. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court offers no adequate
justification for treating the narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differently from
other districting claims.").
398. See id. at 2833 app. (displaying a map of the 1991 North Carolina congressional district
plan).
399. As phrased by Justice Stevens, "[i]f it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide ade-
quate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish-Americans,
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2. The Court's Failure to Insist on a Discriminatory Intent and
Effect
When analyzing any case involving voting rights, one must ex-
amine the legislative intent of Congress in passing the Voting Rights
Act, and in particular, the 1982 Amendments. The Voting Rights
Act was clearly designed to combat pervasive voting rights discrimi-
nation against African-Americans in this country.4"' The "uncouth
twenty-eight-sided" gerrymander at issue in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,4"' is only one example of the blatant attempts made by
white controlled legislatures to fence African-Americans out of the
voting process.40 2 Thus, the majority's statement in Shaw that, "[iut
is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the
most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past, '40 3 is misleading
and irrelevant. In Gomillion, the Court did not state that the shape
of the gerrymander was of particular significance. 04 What made the
gerrymander egregious was that it, "fenc[ed] Negro citizens out of
or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for [African-
Americans]." Id. at 2844-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In regards to the district at issue, one com-
mentator wrote, "understanding why the configurations are shaped as they are requires us to know
at least as much about the interests of incumbent Democratic politicians, as it does knowledge of
the Voting Rights Act." Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had
Said: "When it Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 CAR-
DOZO L REV. 1237, 1258 (1993) [hereinafter Grofman, Lombardi]. Further, when a claim is
made that a minority district is not sufficiently compact, such claims, "should be laughed out of
court when it is apparent that . . . in the present plan, . . . districts drawn for political reasons
are (or have been) drawn with shapes or other features comparable to those of the minority dis-
tricts to which objections are currently being made." Id. at 1259 (emphasis in original). For ex-
ample, in the late Nineteenth Century, Democrats in South Carolina and Mississippi drew notori-
ously bizarre congressional districts. Kousser, supra note 39, at 144.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 56-77 (discussing the Voting Rights Act and Amend-
ments); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (stating that the Act
was designed to eliminate discrimination against minority voters).
401. 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
402. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text (describing other cases in which white-
controlled legislatures have attempted to fence out African-American voters).
403. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993).
404. In fact, until Shaw, the Court has never held that voting districts must look a certain way.
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973) (citing White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783
(1973); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 54 (1964)). There are many valid reasons for why
districts may appear unusual. For example, it is often necessary to avoid drawing boundaries lines
in the middle of natural geographic obstacles such as lakes, rivers and mountains, or to draw them
around large tracts of land where no one resides such as cemeteries and shopping malls. At best,
strangely shaped districts are only, "a signal that something may be amiss." Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U.S. 725, 758 (1983); see Grofman, Lombardi, supra note 399, at 1258 n.83 (discussing why
"ill-compactness" in voting districts is not per se undesirable).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote. °4 0 5
In Shaw, the white voters were certainly not "fenced out," and a
discriminatory intent does not exist where, as here, the majority
clearly acts to benefit the minority.40 6
According to United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey,40 7 a
state such as North Carolina, which is subject to the Voting Rights
Act, is not prevented from "deliberately creating or preserving black
majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its reappor-
tionment plan complies with Section 5."'40 In a later opinion where
she discussed the UJO case, Justice O'Connor, the author of the
Shaw opinion, stated that states have a "constitutional duty to take
affirmative steps to eliminate the continuing effects of past unconsti-
tutional discrimination."40 9 The fact pattern in UJO was remarkably
similar to the situation in Shaw. In UJO, the Attorney General be-
lieved New York's original redistricting plan did not pass muster
under the Act.41 0 In response, the state legislature created several
majority-minority districts with higher percentages of non-white
majorities than under the original plan. 411 This action split a group
of white voters between two districts, thereby diluting their voting
strength.41 2 In ruling against the white voters, the Court stated that
even in the absence of its authority under the Voting Rights Act,
the state was free to make any redistricting changes that did not
violate the Constitution.4"3 The Court held that the plaintiffs could
not prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because they
405. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
406. Discrimination is defined as, "[u]nfair treatment or denial of normal privileges because of
[a group's] race, age sex, nationality or religion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at
467. This definition is consistent with how the Court has interpreted the term. See Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-17 (1982) (discussing how certain voting schemes have the effect of
discriminating against minorities by diluting their voting strength); White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755 (1973) (holding that a redistricting plan was being used by the majority to invidiously dis-
criminate against minority racial groups); see also Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders . . . [is] whether
their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the
expense of any minority group.").
407. 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion).
408. Id. at 161.
409. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original). O'Connor also noted that prior Court rulings recognized the states' author-
ity to voluntarily take race-conscious initiatives to comply with the law even if a specific finding of
past discrimination is never made. Id.
410. UJO, 430 U.S. at 150.
411. Id. at 151-52.
412. Id. at 152.
413. Id. at 165.
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could not show that the scheme was enacted with the intent, or had
the effect of, discriminating against white voters.4 14
The majority in Shaw conceded that race-conscious redistricting
is not always unconstitutional.4 15 They never purported to overrule
UJO, or implied that its reasoning was invalid in any way.4 6 Thus,
the only possible way the white plaintiffs in the Shaw case should
have been able to successfully challenge the redistricting scheme is
if they could specifically prove both a discriminatory intent and ef-
fect under the traditional Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Instead
of requiring such a showing, however, the Shaw majority chose to
remove this burden from the plaintiffs by creating an entirely new
cause of action where plaintiffs can win an Equal Protection suit by
merely showing the plan "rationally cannot be understood as any-
thing other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting
districts on the basis of race. 417
The Court's holding is troubling for a number of reasons. The
majority's failure to insist on a showing of discriminatory intent and
effect undermines one of the purposes for having this kind of Four-
teenth Amendment analysis in the first place, i.e., that the plaintiff
suffered some kind of cognizable harm 4 8 because he was subjected
to intentional differential treatment, 1 9 which resulted in discrimina-
tory effects. 20 In Shaw, the state explicitly stated that it used race
in a purposeful manner, but its intent was simply to comply with the
mandate of the Attorney General and the Act.4 12  The Court did not
414. Id. at 165-66. The Court accepted the lower court's finding that the new plan gave whites
70% of the state assembly and state senate districts even though they only constituted 65% of the
population. Id. at 166.
415. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993). They also agreed with the dissenters that
redistricting is inherently different from other kinds of race-conscious state decision-making be-
cause legislators are always aware of race when creating districts, just as they are aware of many
other demographic factors. Id. at 2826.
416. See id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting) ("The Court today chooses not to overrule, but
rather to sidestep, UJO."). In fact, the Court cited UJO for the proposition that a state can create
majority-minority districts to provide fair representation for minority groups, and to prevent the
majority from repeatedly outvoting them. Id. at 2829.
417. Id. at 2830.
418. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the plaintiffs should not prevail because
they have not stated a cognizable injury).
419. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (stating that even though Afri-
can-Americans failed police examinations four times as frequently as whites, this was not enough
to hold that they suffered from intentional discrimination).
420. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that although a
statute was neutral on its face, it was applied in a racially discriminatory way).
421. Brief for the State Appellee's at 13-14, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-
357).
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find this to be a constitutionally invidious intent in UJO, 22 nor does
it logically constitute such an intent.423 "[A]wareness that a decision
will have a specific impact on a protected class . ..does not by
itself constitute the invidious intent necessary to make out an equal
protection claim. 424 This is not a case such as Strauder v. West
Virginia where the Court struck down a law enacted by the white
legislature which harmed all African-Americans by preventing them
from serving on juries. 425 Here, common sense dictates that the
white-majority North Carolina legislature did not act with "hatred
of or condescension toward 4 26 white voters.427
In Beer v. United States,428 the Court held that before a redis-
tricting plan can obtain preclearance from the Attorney General,
the state must demonstrate that the plan will not "lead to a retro-
gression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their ef-
fective exercise of the electoral franchise." '429 As long as minority
representation is not reduced under the new plan there is no viola-
tion of the Act.430 Thus, the Act requires state legislatures to con-
sider race when creating voting districts, because if they fail to, they
may create districts which dilute minority voting power - a result
prohibited by Thornburg.431
Even if the plaintiffs could have succeeded in arguing that the
legislature's race conscious intent constitutes invidious intent,432
they would have faced an almost impossible challenge in proving a
discriminatory effect.4 3 In UJO, the petitioners did not object to the
422. United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (plurality opinion).
423. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (discussing invidious intent generally).
424. Brief for the State Appellees at 16, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357)
(citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)).
425. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
426. Brief for the State Appellees at 18, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357)
(citing Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 760 (1993) as the Court's
most recent interpretation of invidious intent).
427. The district court in Shaw stated that it could infer such an intent in this case if the
North Carolina state legislature consisted of an African-American majority. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F.
Supp. 461, 472 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816
(1993).
428. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
429. Id. at 141.
430. O'Rourke, supra note 160, at 93.
431. Brief Amici Curiae of Bolley Johnson, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Peter
R. Wallace, Chairman of the Reapportionment Committee of the Florida House of Representa-
tives, in Support of Appellees at 14-16, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357).
432. Apparently, the Appellants in Shaw argued for a reinterpretation of invidious intent. Brief
for the state Appellees at 27, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357).
433. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2838 (1993) (arguing that the appellants have not alleged
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effect of the revised plan on white voters.4"4 In fact, they could not
have argued that they suffered from discriminatory effects, since
even under the revised plan, the sixty-five percent white population
would have representatives in seventy percent of the districts at is-
sue.4 35 The Court concluded that "whites would not be under-
represented relative to their share of the population. 436 Similarly,
in Shaw, under the rejected plan, the seventy-six percent white pop-
ulation would have had a majority in eighty-three percent of the
congressional districts.43 7 Thus, the only possible discriminatory ef-
fect that Appellants could have suffered is that they were denied the
"privilege" of having a better than fifty percent chance that their
representative would be white.438 The Appellants apparently did not
allege such a claim since they asserted that they had a "constitu-
tional right to participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process. 439
Such an allegation would have been unwise anyway, since the Court
has never held that citizens have the right to vote for a "winning
candidate. ' 440 This is not to suggest that the Act gave minority
groups a right to proportional representation. 44 1 However, when a
the requisite discriminatory effects).
434. United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977) (plurality opinion). In UJO,
the petitioners argued that as members of the Hasidic Jewish population, their group voting Iower
was diluted. Id. at 152-53. They alleged that the revised plan "'would dilute the value of each
plaintiff's franchise by halving its effectiveness.' " Id. at 152 (quoting Petitioner's Brief in United
Jewish Org. v. Wilson, 377 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), afd 510 F.2d 512 (2d. Cir.
1975)).
435. Id. at 166.
436. Id.
437. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting).
438. In UJO, all seven of the districts at issue under the revised plan contained African-Ameri-
can populations ranging from 65-90%. UJO, 430 U.S. at 151-52. In Shaw, the district at issue
was only 53.34% African-American, and thus gave white voters a much greater chance to elect a
white representative than the districts approved of in UJO. Brief for the state Appellees at 24a,
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357).
439. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. It is difficult to understand the motivation in bringing the suit
in the first place since the Appellant, Ruth Shaw, told reporters she voted for Melvin Watt, an
African-American, in the last congressional election. Jim Morrill, 2 N.C. Citizens' Names at
Center of Voting Rights Debate, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 7, 1993, at Al. Of course, Shaw's
ability to vote for Watt, or anyone else for that matter, was not impaired by the creation of an
unusually-shaped district.
440. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the fact that one must
sometimes face the prospect of voting for a losing candidate does not constitute discriminatory
treatment); see also Brief for the state Appellees' at 36-37, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993)
(No. 92-357) (citing cases which support the proposition).
441. In fact, in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). the Court stated that the Act is not
violated solely because the group lacks proportional representation. Id. at 46; see Bruce E. Cain,
Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-Blind Society, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING, supra note 35, at 261, 262-66 (discussing the arguments for and against pro-
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group has had disproportionate representation in their favor for de-
cades and would continue to under a new plan, the Court should at
the very least presume that "this segment of the population is [not]
being denied access to the political system.""' 2
Another reason why the Court's automatic presumption of an in-
vidious intent based on the shape of the district is troublesome is
because the Court has only rarely presumed a discriminatory intent
based solely on discriminatory effects.443 For example, in Wright v.
Rockefeller,"" the Court held that a district drawn with "zigzag,
tortuous lines''41 was not sufficient evidence to infer a legislative
intent to discriminate based on race.""6 The Court uses the same
analysis in other contexts. In Washington v. Davis,447 it was argua-
ble that the fact that African-Americans failed police examinations
four times more frequently than whites was a result "unexplainable
on grounds other than race," and thus would not require a specific
showing of discriminatory intent." 8 Nevertheless, the Court held
that the disproportionate impact in that case was not enough to war-
rant a finding that it reflected a discriminatory purpose." 9 One of
the reasons the Court did not believe a discriminatory intent existed
in the Washington case was because of the affirmative attempts
made by the police department to recruit African-Americans.451
This is analogous to Shaw, where the state legislature, acting pursu-
ant to the Attorney General's order, took an affirmative step to aid
African-American voters by creating majority-minority districts. 41
portional representation).
442. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 154-155 (1971).
443. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825. Strict scrutiny applies to those "rare statutes that, although
race-neutral, are, on their face, unexplainable on grounds other than race." Id. (quoting Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
444. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
445. Id. at 59 (Douglas, J., & Goldberg, J., dissenting).
446. Id. at 58. If the Act was never enacted, the Wright case may have given the states wide
latitude in drawing gerrymanders with the intent to ensure minorities were disproportionately un-
derrepresented. Robert C. Smith, Liberal Jurisprudence and the Quest for Racial Representation,
15 S.U. L. REV. I, 7 & n.16 (1988) (citing Wright v. Rockefeller and Legislative Gerrymanders:
The Desegregation Decisions Plus a Problem of Proof 72 YALE L.J. 1061 (1963)).
447. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
448. Id. at 237 ("This disproportionate impact, standing alone and without regard to whether it
indicated a discriminatory purpose, was held sufficient to establish a constitutional violation [by
the appellate court].").
449. Id. at 246.
450. Id.
451. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993).
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3. The Court's New "Bizarre Shape" Standard is Unworkable
and Illogical
In Shaw, the Court established a new rule whereby it can make a
presumption of invidious intent based solely on the "bizarre" shape
of a legislative district. 52 Perhaps the new standard would have
made more sense if the Court provided some objective guidelines for
legislators to follow when creating districts, instead of exclusively
relying on an extremely vague term like "bizarre."4 53 For example,
the Court could have struck down the district because it was, in the
words of one commentator, "non-cognizable." 4 54 According to this
concept, a district is non-cognizable if ordinary citizens of the dis-
trict cannot easily explain where the boundaries of their district are
located.455 At least this kind of standard would give legislators and
the lower courts something from which to work. After Shaw, offi-
cials will undoubtedly have a very difficult time determining when a
particular district is unconstitutionally "bizarre."45 No one would
seriously argue that the Shaw Court decreed that all districts must
resemble squares; yet, one must wonder how non-cubical a district
must appear before it is labeled "bizarre." The North Carolina con-
gressional districts illustrate the difficulty in making this determina-
tion. 57 Although none of the other districts are as "snake-like" as
452. Id. at 2824-25.
453. According to the Court, when deciding if an unconstitutional racial gerrymander exists,
appearances make all the difference. Id. at 2827. The Court stated that an unconstitutional gerry-
mander is one that is "dramatically irregular" and contains people "who may have little in com-
mon with one another but the color of their skin." Id.
454. See Grofman, Lombardi, supra note 399, at 1261. This same commentator filed an affida-
vit in Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992) where he offered the "non-cognizability"
of the North Carolina district as a rationale for invalidating it. Id.
455. Id. at 1262. For example, if citizens of a district could not easily describe where their
district's boundaries are because the lines do not follow logical patterns along major geographical
or political referents, the district could be characterized as "non-cognizable." Id. at 1261-62.
456. Even the majority opinion acknowledges this fact. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826. Although the
dissenters in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 59 (1964), described the district in that case as
having "zigzag, tortuous lines," the majority in Shaw stated that the boundaries in that case,
"were not so bizarre as to permit of no other conclusion [than that they were drawn exclusively
along racial lines]." Id. According to the Court, "Wright illustrates the difficulty of determining
from the face [of a districting plan] that it purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis
of race." Id. Further, the Court stated that the petitioners in UJO could not have argued that the
district in that case was unconstitutionally "irregular." Id. at 2829.
457. Id. at 2833 (illustrating the North Carolina redistricting plan); see Richard H. Pildes &
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights. Evaluating Elec-
tion District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MiCH. L. REV. 483, 536-59 (1993) (discussing
possible means of defining districts that are "bizarre" enough to warrant strict scrutiny review).
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the one at issue in Shaw, some are arguably just as unusual.45 8 One
expert believes that the only way to reconcile the Shaw decision
with Court precedents is by interpreting the case as creating a very
narrow rule where only the most unusual districts are subject to
constitutional attack. 5 9
Another problem with the Court's new test is its use of the words
"segregation" 4 60 and "political apartheid" '461 to describe the district
in Shaw. These terms were obviously used more for their emotional
value, rather than for any guidance they might provide in analyzing
other gerrymanders." 2 Nevertheless, "segregation" has a specific le-
gal meaning, 6" and the Court should avoid using it in such a sloppy
and inaccurate way. The majority cited Gomillion v. Lightfoot,4 64
and stated that the gerrymander in that case effectively "segre-
gated" all of the African-American voters by excluding them from
the city limits.46 5 The Court implies that the same thing took place
in Shaw, except this time it was the white voters who were segre-
gated out of an exclusively African-American district.466 Nothing
was further from the truth. The district was 45.21 % white 6  and
458. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2833 app. For example, by examining a map of North Carolina's
congressional districts, one notices that its Second District is almost as long as the "snake-like"
12th District at issue in Shaw, only "fatter," the Seventh District would actually resemble a
longer snake than the 12th if stretched out, the Third District resembles a weird five-appendage
beast, and the 11 th District has a gaping hole in the Eastern half of it which divides five counties.
"[C]ontorted districts are the rule, not the exception, in North Carolina's congressional redistrict-
ing plan." Brief Amicus Curiae of the Republican National Committee, in Support of Appellants
at 13, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). It is likely that North Carolina gerrymandered the
state's congressional districts to protect the incumbents. In 1992, all the white-majority districts in
North Carolina did, in fact, reelect incumbents. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2833 n.10 (citing CAPITOL
DIRECTORY. Donnald K. Anderson, Clerk of the House of Representatives (Jan. 3, 1993)); see
Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the Problem of Racial Gerryman-
dering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652, 653 & n.10 (1993) (stating that the
"ugly" Seventh and Fifth Districts were designed to ensure reelection of incumbents).
459. Grofman, High Court Ruling, supra note 382, at 19. Grofman stated: "I expect few (if
any) challenges to minority districts under the " 'so bizarre' " test. Id.
460. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830.
461. Id. at 2827.
462. Id. at 2840 (White, J., dissenting). According to White, "[p]art of the explanation for the
majority's approach has to do, perhaps, with the emotions stirred by words such as "'segrega-
tion' " and " 'political apartheid.' " Id.
463. Segregation is defined as a "practice of separating people on the basis of color.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 1358.
464. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
465. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825.
466. Id.
467. Brief for the state Appellees Brief at 24a, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-
357).
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was described as one of the most integrated in North Carolina. 6 8
This is in no way analogous to the kind of segregation the Court
proscribed in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education."9 In
Brown, the Court held that racial segregation in public schools was
inherently unequal, because it "generates a feeling of inferiority as
to [African-American students'] status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be un-
done."47 Furthermore, the law at issue in that case created a com-
plete separation of white and African-American students. 71 In stark
contrast, it is almost laughable to suggest that the white plaintiffs in
Shaw, or anyone else in the state, felt "inferior" after the creation
of the district.4 72 A better argument is that before the district was
created, African-Americans may have felt a sense of inferiority
since they suffered from years of state-sponsored racial discrimina-
tion,473 and were not represented in Congress by an African-Ameri-
can for nearly 100 years. 74
The Court believes that unusually-shaped districts are destructive,
because instead of bringing communities together, such districts pull
them apart.475 Ironically, just the opposite is true with regard to the
district in Shaw. The Court has held that federal courts should re-
frain from making attempts to cure de facto segregation.476 How-
ever, there is no reason state legislators should not consider creative
468. Silberman, supra note 380.
469. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (prohibiting racial
segregation of public schools in the District of Columbia).
470. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
471. Id. at 488.
472. Apparently the Court believes the district reinforces racial stereotypes, and thus promotes
a stigmatic harm. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993); id. at 2849 n.9 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The Appellants never claimed to have suffered any stigmatic harm. Id. Furthermore,
since the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People filed an amicus brief in
support of the Appellees in which they argued for affirmance of the lower court's decision, it is
implausible that African-Americans in or outside the district suffered any stigmatic injury. Brief
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
at 2, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357).
473. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (discussing pervasive official racial discrimi-
nation in North Carolina).
474. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Harvard Law Professor Randall
Kennedy was troubled by the Court's failure to address the lack of minority representation in
Congress, and the Court's seeming denial of the problem. Hank Grezlak, Professor Cites Flaws in
Minority Voting Case, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 5, 1993, at 3.
475. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
476. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971) (holding that in the
absence of a finding of de jure segregation, a school board need not make efforts to change the
racial composition of the student body).
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ways of eliminating de facto segregation. In Shaw, North Carolina
arguably did just that when it took racially divided communities and
brought them together in one congressional district. Individuals who
previously may have had nothing in common were given a reason to
get to know each other, cooperate, and work together to achieve
common goals. 477 The Shaw Court effectively destroyed this unique
opportunity because it considers the district a threat to "our system
of representative democracy. 4 , 78
B. "Color-Blindness" is a Social and Legal Fiction
If the Court had made its "bizarre-shape" test applicable to polit-
ically-based, ethnicity-based, union-member based, and other kinds
of gerrymanders in addition to race-based ones, the Court's opinion
may not seem so unsound. 479 However, the Court created this test
exclusively for racial-gerrymanders. 480 The majority's rationale is
that unusually-shaped racial gerrymanders reinforce stereotypes,481
threaten to "balkanize us into competing racial factions, ' '"82 and
carry us further away from the ideal of a color-blind society. 48 3 Of
course, it is true that in a perfect world where one's skin color truly
does not matter, there would be no reason to create voting districts
based on race.484 Unfortunately, clear racial divisions have existed
477. In fact, residents of the Twelfth District already had much in common. For example, the
district had the state's highest percentage of single-mother households, the highest rate of public
transportation use, and the highest rate of AIDS cases. Ripley Eagles Rand, Note, The Fancied
Line: Shaw v. Reno and the Chimerical Racial Gerrymander, 72 N.C. L. REV. 725, 756 n.263
(1994).
478. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828.
479. As put by Justice Stevens in dissent, "[i]f it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide
adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Ameri-
cans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for
[African-Americans]." Id. at 2844-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
480. Id. ("[Niothing in our case law compels the conclusion that racial and political gerryman-
ders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny."). In the next sentence, the Court
stated that a higher level of scrutiny should apply to race-based gerrymanders because of this
country's history of racial discrimination in voting. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 2832.
483. Id. According to the Court, they are also harmful because they encourage representatives
to only work for the interests of their racial group, and not for their entire constituency. Id. at
2828. Apparently, the Appellant, Ruth Shaw, did not believe this was the case since she voted for
Mel Watt, an African-American, during the last congressional election. Morrill, supra note 439,
at Al.
484. If racial factors in voting truly do not matter, one must wonder why the Voting Rights
Act was ever enacted, or why the Court formulated the Thornburg test, which requires legislators
to consider race when devising redistricting plans. See supra text accompanying notes 138-47
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in this country for centuries and continue to live on today.48 5 Al-
though few would deny that we have made real advancements in the
area of race-relations, 8 6 race continues to play a major role in the
political and social affairs of this country." '
1. Stereotypes and Realities in Voting
In Shaw, the Court stated that an unusually-shaped racial gerry-
mander, "reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group - regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which the [sic] live - think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls. ''488 In the next sentence, the Court calls this perception an
"impermissible racial stereotype. ''1 8 9 While it is of course a stereo-
type that members of the same racial group think alike, this is not
the issue at hand. What the Court fails to acknowledge, and what
has been proven through empirical studies, is that individuals tend
to vote for people from their racial group' 90 because they under-
(discussing the Thornburg test).
485. See Aleinikoff, supra note 350 (discussing the continuing impact of racial discrimination
in various American contexts including employment, housing, and higher education).
486. ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM. WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS 1-10 (1987).
487. Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, Postscript: What is the Best Route to a Color-
Blind Society?, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 35, at 300, 300. ("[1]n our
view . . . ours is a race-conscious world in which there remains a need for race-conscious remedies
.... "); Aleinikoff, supra note 350, at 325, 330 (claiming that racism "remains a social disease,
one that - far from being cured - has barely been controlled"); see Nancy J. King, Postconviction
Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92
MICH. L. REV. 63, 67-105 (1993) (arguing that racial discrimination can have a real and measur-
able affect on juror decisions); Simpson, supra note 382, at 397 (arguing that the use of the
primary runoff can be used to effectively restrain African-American political influence).
488. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
489. Id. The Court goes on to state that "a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very pat-
terns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract." Id.
In reality, majority-minority districts are seemingly created because they acknowledge, rather
than necessarily alleviate, the unfortunate phenomenon of racial bloc voting.
490. Aleinikoff, supra note 350, at 348. According to a recent survey, one out of every seven
whites openly stated that they would not vote for an African-American. Id. (citing TOM W.
SMITH. NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, ETHNIC IMAGES, GSS
TOPICAL REPORT No.19 at 4 (1990)). According to another recent study, "[the] evidence points
to the pervasive impact on race in American politics." Jack Citrin et al., White Reactions to
Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter? 54 PUB. Op. Q 74, 91 (1990). Extreme cases of
racially polarized voting have been recorded throughout the United States. See McDonald, supra
note 80, at 75-76. It is possible that racial polarization is even more severe than the studies indi-
cate because voters are possibly reluctant to reveal their racist voting patterns to survey takers.
See Charles A. Bullock, Ill & Michael A. Maggiotto, Survey Research and Racially Polarized
Voting, 33 JURIMETRICS 133, 137 (1992); Steven A. Finkel et al, Race of Interviewer Effects in a
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standably believe that these candidates, once elected, will better un-
derstand and strive to achieve their group's interests.4 9' Few minor-
ity voters would dispute this, although at least one commentator has
argued that African-American representatives may not be as re-
sponsive to their group's interests as is commonly believed. 9 Obvi-
ously, this is not to say that an African-American would never vote
for a white, or that a white would never vote for an African-Ameri-
can.498 Furthermore, one cannot assume that just because an Afri-
can-American community elected an African-American official, he
is automatically "representative" of that community.4 9' These are
simply generalities based on current political realities that we must
acknowledge in order to make intelligent decisions concerning voting
rights.495
The Court is understandably troubled by the sad reality of ra-
Preelection Poll: Virginia 1989, 55 PuB. Op. Q. 313, 313-14 (1991); see also Lani Guinier, The
Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1112-13 (1991) (citing numerous court opinions, reports, surveys, and stud-
ies clearly showing the existence of racially polarized voting).
491.
[W]hy shouldn't there be racial voting patterns? Behind the repeated empirical obser-
vations of racially polarized voting lie fundamental differences in the socioeconomic
positions of white and black Americans. This fact has critical importance, not only in
recognizing the fact of racial divergence in the political process but in explaining the
persistence of these differences.
Issacharoff, supra note 172, at 1877; see Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Jewish Congress,
in Support of Appellants at 2, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) ("Given the secret ballot,
government cannot prevent people from voting on a racial, religious, sexual, or ethnic basis. These
are essential elements of who Americans are. It is therefore understandable, if not necessarily
admirable, that such voting takes place."); see also Evelyn Elayne Shockley, Note, Voting Rights
Act Section 2: Racially Polarized Voting and the Minority Community's Representative of
Choice, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1038 (1991) (discussing various methods of determining for which
candidate a minority group will tend to vote); Sushma Soni, Note, Defining the Minority-Pre-
ferred Candidate Under Section 2, 99 YALE L.J. 1651 (1990) (discussing various methods for
determining who the minority-preferred candidate is).
492. Guinier, supra note 490, at 1128-34.
493. THERNSTROM. supra note 486, at 210 (reporting rare occasions where African-American
voters have supported white candidates over African-American ones); Carol M. Swain, Some
Consequences of the Voting Rights Act, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING. supra note 35,
at 292, 293 n.20 (citing elections where African-American candidates have won with substantial
white support, and where African-American voters have supported white candidates); see also
supra note 298 and accompanying text (showing some white support for a few African-American
officials in North Carolina).
494. Guinier, supra note 490, at 1103 n. 115 ("Authentic representatives need not be black as
long as the source of their authority, legitimacy, and power base is in the black community.").
495. "No matter how much we may try to hide it, race has been a significant, often crucial
factor in elections throughout American history, even when opponents were of the same race, and
we're not rid of it yet. Instead, we should deal with it - realistically." Clarence Page, Color is
Fading in Mayoral Races, CHI. TRIB.. Nov. 7, 1993, § 4, at 3.
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cially polarized voting in this country, but this is no excuse for disre-
garding polarization as a mere "stereotype."496 After all, few would
seriously dispute that other political realities in the United States
are not stereotypes. For example, people who belong to a certain
political party tend to vote for members of the same political
party,497 individuals who live in rural communities tend to vote for
candidates who live in rural communities, 98 and members of ethnic
groups tend to vote for representatives with whom they share the
same ethnic background."99 After Shaw, these groups can continue
to draw unusually-shaped gerrymanders that are even more odd-
looking than the one at issue in that case, without any fear of consti-
tutional challenge.5 0 0 The Court fails to explain why racially-based
gerrymanders pose a greater threat to "balkanization" 50 1 of our so-
ciety than ethnicity-based or politically-based gerrymandering
schemes.
Obviously, the most persuasive evidence that we are not dealing
with stereotypes is the fact that out of the twenty-six new majority-
minority congressional districts created after the 1990 Census,50 2
twenty-five districts elected African-American representatives. 0
Both majority-minority districts in North Carolina elected African-
American congressmen. 0 4 Regardless of how one feels about de
facto segregation, the reason majority-minority districts are usually
496. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2817 (1993).
497. For a thorough discussion of political gerrymandering, see generally POLITICAL GERRY-
MANDERING AND THE COURTS (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Pop-
per, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerryman-
dering. 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301 (1991); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan
Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987).
498. Richard Morrill, A Geographer's Perspective, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE
COURTS supra note 497, at 212, 216 ("At the broadest scale there is a strong historic divergence
of identity between an urban core (central city), suburbs, and rural small town areas, because
they are usually different jurisdictions, because they have different needs and problems, and be-
cause they attract people with different values and preferences.").
499. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 152 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(involving Hasidic Jewish community members bringing suit after their district was split in half
by a redistricting plan).
500. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828 (stating that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to
different constitutional scrutiny).
501. Id. at 2832.
502. Biskupic, supra note 89, at A4.
503. XIX CONGRESSIONAL YELLOW BOOK 1 (Brian J. Combs ed., 1993). Gene Green, the
representative from the Latino-majority 29th District in Texas is white. Redistricting: A State By
State Look, AM. POL. NETWORK, INC. THE HOTLINE, June 30, 1993, available in, LEXIS, News
Library, Hotlne File.
504. Frank McCoy, Racial Politics and the High Court, BLACK ENTER.. Nov. 1993, at 25.
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easy to create is because ethnic and racial groups tend to congregate
in the same areas.50 5 This is particularly true in urban settings like
Chicago.506 Some experts believe districts, like Illinois' Fourth Con-
gressional District in Chicago, which are located entirely within ur-
ban areas, could successfully defend a constitutional challenge." 7
The experts note that although these districts may, in the words of
the Court, "contain people who belong to the same race," the people
are usually not "widely separated by geographic and political
boundaries."50 8 If a lower court rules that Shaw does not apply to
unusually-shaped districts in urban areas, and the Court grants cer-
tiorari, the members of such districts can only hope the Justices ac-
knowledge de facto racial segregation in major cities instead of cav-
alierly calling this phenomenon just another "stereotype."
If polarized voting is indeed merely a "stereotype," the Court
must explain how a plaintiff is now supposed to prove polarized vot-
ing under the Thornburg test.5 9 The only possible way to reconcile
Shaw with Thornburg is to interpret the former as stating that evi-
dence of polarized voting is an impermissible stereotype if the case
involves an unusually-shaped gerrymander, but is a vital necessity if
a minority group seeks to prove a districting plan dilutes its voting
505. Joe T. Darden, Accessibility to Housing: Differential Residential Segregation for Blacks,
Hispanics, American Indians, and Asians, in RACE, ETHNICITY. & MINORITY HOUSING IN THE
UNITED STATES 107, 124 (Jamshid A. Momeni ed., 1986); see Angela D. Chatman, Author Says
City Remains Divided, THE CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 28, 1993, at 6F (finding that Afri-
can-Americans are more segregated than Latinos, Asians, or Native-Americans). After exten-
sively researching 38 major U.S. cities, Nancy A. Denton concluded that " '[blacks are segre-
gated twice as much as Hispanics.' " Id. (quoting Nancy A. Denton in a presentation given to
Countrywide Financial Institutions Advisory Committee). Demographic researchers have found
that " '[tihere was little, if any, reduction in residential segregation of blacks during the 1980s.' "
Bob Dart, Study Foresees Dollar Dividing Blacks, THE ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 9, 1991, at
A2 (quoting Kelvin Pollard, author of the report: African-Americans in the 1990s, prepared by
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, INC.).
506. See Mark W. Zimmerman, Note, Opening the Door to Race-Based Real Estate Market-
ing. South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors, 41 DEPAUL
L. REV 1271, 1271 n.2 (1992) (citing John E. Farley, Segregation in 1980: How Segregated Are
America's Metropolitan Areas?, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, CHANGING PATTERNS OF RACIAL
SEGREGATION 100 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987) for the proposition that segregation levels in Chi-
cago remained constant between the years 1970-1980). The president of a fair-housing agency
recently stated that "Chicago is still one of the most segregated cities in the country." Elizabeth
Birge, More Attention to Segregation Urged, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1993, at 3.
507. Glasser, supra note 24.
508. Id. Representative Luiz Gutierrez of the 4th District said " '[m]y district doesn't run 160
miles. It takes 60 minutes to go to any part and that is in the worst of Chicago traffic.'" Id.
(quoting Representative Gutierrez).
509. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Thornburg test and its
requirement that minority plaintiffs provide evidence of racially polarized voting).
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strength .5 1  It is improbable that the Shaw majority is proclaiming
that they will never recognize the existence of racially polarized vot-
ing, as they never questioned the validity of the Thornburg Court's
acknowledgement of this social phenomenon. 51  Nevertheless, the
Court conceivably will now require minority plaintiffs to overcome
the presumption that racially polarized voting is a stereotype in or-
der to prevail under the Thornburg test, thereby increasing the stan-
dard of proof. Some scholars criticized the Thornburg test precisely
because the standard of proving minority vote dilution was poten-
tially too easy to meet.512
2. Minority Voting Rights and Affirmative Action: An Analogy
The Shaw majority asserted in dictum that, "racial classifications
of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society." ' Appar-
ently, this risk was not present in the dozens of prior cases where
the Court approved of racial classifications, particularly in the af-
firmative action and jury selection areas. 514  For example, in the
most recent affirmative action case, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,51 5 the Court allowed the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) to consider minority ownership as one of several factors
when the FCC awards radio licenses.5 16 The Court did not believe
that the FCC's policy of encouraging diversity fostered an imper-
510. As phrased by Justice Stevens in dissent, "citizens and legislators . . . will no doubt be
confused by the Court's requirement of evidence in one type of case that the Constitution now
prevents reliance on in another." Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2844 n.3. (1993) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). An interesting dilemma will occur if a minority group seeks to prove an oddly-shaped
white-majority district dilutes the minority group's voting strength. Should the group bring forth
evidence of racial polarization in the hope of meeting the Thornburg test, or should it argue that
the district is "bizarrely-shaped" enough to warrant a finding that it fosters impermissible racial
stereotypes? It would probably have to do both due to the difficulty in determining in advance
whether a district is unconstitutionally unusually-shaped. See supra notes 452-59 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the difficulty in determining what constitutes a "bizarrely-shaped" district).
511. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 52 (1986).
512. See THERNSTROM. supra note 486, at 222-23. According to Thernstrom, it is "possible to
condemn a particular method of election even though it has permitted considerable electoral suc-
cess for minority candidates. . . . A multimember district in which the majority of whites voted
differently from the majority of blacks is . . . suspect even if blacks are winning in proportion to
their numbers." Id.
513. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
514. See supra notes 192-243 and accompanying text (discussing racial classifications in some
of the Court's affirmative action and jury selection cases).
515. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); see supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts and holding of Metro Broadcasting).
516. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3004-09.
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missible stereotype."1 7 On the contrary, the Court reasonably be-
lieved that minority-owned radio stations would tend to produce
programs that generally appeal to minority audiences,518 and re-
present their point of view. 519 The Court held that the FCC's poli-
cies served to achieve the important governmental goal of increasing
broadcast diversity. 520 Perhaps the Shaw Court believes the goal of
increasing broadcast diversity is more important than achieving di-
versity in Congressional legislators.
In a previous affirmative action case, Fullilove v. Klutznick,521
the Court held that Congress could mandate that ten percent of the
federal funds granted for local public works projects had to be allo-
cated to minority business enterprises (MBE's). 522 Both the Metro
Broadcasting and Fullilove cases are significant to Shaw, because
they demonstrate that the Court deals with race-conscious remedial
measures instituted by Congress in a very deferential manner.523
This is in sharp contrast to cases such as City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 524  and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,52 5
where the Court invalidated affirmative action programs instituted
by local authorities.520 One reason a higher level of deference is
517. The Court stated that, "[tihe judgment that there is a link between expanded minority
ownership and broadcast diversity does not rest on impermissible stereotyping." Id. at 3016.
518. See id. at 3003 (" 'Acute underrepresentation of minorities among the owners of broadcast
properties is troublesome because it is the licensee who is ultimately responsible for identifying
and serving the needs and interests of his or her audience.' ") (quoting FCC MINORITY OWNER-
SHIP TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MINORITY OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTING 1 (1978)).
519. See id. at 3004 (" '[W]e are compelled to observe that the views of racial minorities con-
tinue to be inadequately represented in the broadcast media. This situation is detrimental not only
to the minority audience but to all of the viewing and listening public.' ") (quoting Statement of
Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 980-81 (1978)).
520. Id. at 3028.
521. 448 U.S. 448 (1980); see supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts and holding of Fullilove).
522. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-54, 492.
523. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008 ("We hold that benign race-conscious measures
mandated by Congress - even if those measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed
to compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination - are constitutionally per-
missible to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives. ... ); Fullilove, 448
U.S. at 472 ("[W]e are bound to approach our task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a
coequal branch ....").
524. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts and holding of Croson).
525. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts and holding of Wygant).
526. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477, 511 (striking down a city ordinance which required prime con-
tractors that received municipal contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the business to MBEs);
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269-71, 273 (striking down the policy of a public school board of providing
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given to Congress is because of its constitutional power to "provide
for the . . . general Welfare of the United States",52 and "to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, 528 the equal protection guarantee
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 529 A related, and perhaps more
practical reason, is that Congress is in a better position than local
authorities to determine whether and when legislation is needed to
correct situations which threaten basic principles of equality.5 30
"Congress as a national legislature . . . stands above factional polit-
ics," 5  and presents less danger of oppression from political factions
than smaller political units.532 Thus, Congress can remedy societal
discrimination even when they have not made specific findings of
discrimination.S
One could easily argue that by enacting the Voting Rights Act,
Congress was attempting to remedy societal discrimination in voting
rights, and that North Carolina and the Attorney General were sim-
ply acting pursuant to this authority. Similar to the Congressional
findings of prior discrimination in Metro Broadcasting,534 and Fulli-
love,535 before enacting the Voting Rights Act, Congress found a
long and pervasive history of voting rights discrimination in the
United States. 56  The fact that extensive racially polarized voting
exists in North Carolina is strong evidence that remedial measures
minority teachers greater protection from lay-offs than white teachers).
527. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
528. Id. amend XIV, & 5.
529. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, I 10 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980); Croson, 488 U.S. at 487-88; see Edward D. Rogers, When Logic and
Reality Collide: The Supreme Court and Minority Business Set-Asides, 24 COLUM. JL. & Soc.
PROBS. 117, 136-41 (1990) (discussing the constitutional authority of Congress to institute affirm-
ative action programs).
530. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91 (discussing when Congress may exercise its power under
the Fourteenth Amendment); see also William P. Langdale, III, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC: The Constitutionality of the FCC's Use of Racial Classifications, 25 GA. L. REV. 535, 554-
65 (1991) (discussing that the Court gives greater deference to Congress in enacting race-based
measures, as opposed to state and local political units).
531. Metro Broadcasting, 10 S. Ct. at 3009.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 3009-10. Congress found that racial and ethnic discrimination in mass media con-
tributed to severe underrepresentation of minorities in this field. Id.
535. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475-76 (1980). Congress found that MBEs were
given disproportinately less public contracting opportunities due to racial and ethnic discrimina-
tion. Id.
536. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing the findings of racial discrimi-
nation in voting rights which led to the passage of the Voting Rights Act).
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are still necessary to rectify the effects of this discrimination. 5 7 By
giving the Attorney General the authority to reject redistricting
plans which may "deny or abridge the right to vote on account of
race or color" under section 5 of the Act,538 one could argue that
Congress effectively mandated that states which were covered
under, but not in compliance with the Act, had to implement a race-
conscious remedial measure to remedy the situation. This remedy is
the creation of majority-minority districts. 539 Unlike the situation in
Croson where the city acted unilaterally, 540 the state legislature in
Shaw acted in direct response to Congress's mandate through the
Attorney General. 54 1 By carrying this reasoning one step further, a
state which is not covered by the Act, but created a majority-minor-
ity district as a race-conscious remedial measure would indeed vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Shaw, the Court ruled that all racial classifications demand
strict scrutiny review even if they are arguably benign, supposedly
because courts are incapable of determining whether a particular
classification is in fact benign.5 42 The Court in Metro Broadcasting,
however, seemed to establish a workable standard for making this
determination.54 3 According to the Metro Broadcasting case, a
judge can separate benign racial classifications from other kinds of
racial classifications by carefully examining the legislative history to
determine the purposes behind the measure.5 4
Perhaps it is true that in some cases, courts will not be able to
537. See supra notes 371-83 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of racial polarization
in North Carolina).
538. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing this provision of the Voting
Rights Act).
539. "Congress has necessary latitude to try new techniques such as the limited use of racial
and ethnic criteria to accomplish remedial objectives." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490.
540. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (holding in part that
states and their subdivisions must specifically identify existing discrimination, which has been ex-
acerbated by the state's own spending, in order to effectuate constitutionally valid remedial
measures).
541. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820-21 (1993).
542. Id. at 2830. But see TRIBE. supra note 98, at 525 (arguing that a racial classification is
suspect, and thus subject to strict scrutiny review, only when the classification, "denigrate[s]
someone's equal worth on racial grounds - as by reinforcing the legacy of slavery").
543. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 n.12 (1990).
544. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)). As an example of a benign classification, the Court
cited the Freedman's Bureau Acts passed shortly after the Civil War to provide aid for African-
Americans. Id.; see Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754-84 (1985) (discussing the history of the Freedman's
Bureau Acts).
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determine whether a classification is actually benign due to
problems such as inconsistent statements made by legislators while
debating the legislation. 45 Nevertheless, if North Carolina's redis-
tricting plan does not constitute a benign form of discrimination,
then there is no such thing as benign discrimination. 54  The Court
would have to disregard more than a decade of precedent holding
that Congress, universities, 547 and even private parties5 8 can take
reasonable steps to remedy the effects of past discrimination. 549
3. Minority Voting Rights and Jury Selection: Another Analogy
Minority voting rights cases are also comparable to jury selection
cases because both involve racial classifications and "stereotypes."
Ever since the case of Strauder v. West Virginia,55 ° the Court has
taken steps to ensure that lawyers do not use peremptory challenges
to dismiss jurors on the grounds of race.551 In Strauder, the Court
concluded that a statute which prohibited all African-Americans
from serving on juries violated the equal protection rights of an Af-
rican-American defendant 552 because of the "prejudices [that] often
exist against particular classes in the community, which sway the
judgment of jurors. ' 553 The potential for racial prejudice against the
defendant was also the main concern in cases such as Swain v. Ala-
bama,55 4 Batson v. Kentucky,555 and Vasquez v. Hillery.556 In Vas-
545. Another reason it is often problematic to examine legislative history is because it is easily
skewed with Congressmen making remarks to an empty chamber.
546. See supra notes 418-42 and accompanying text (arguing that there was no discriminatory
intent or effect in Shaw). Justice Souter, in dissent, argued that race-conscious redistricting was
not a form of discrimination at all, but rather, was one of the few areas in which the use of race in
governmental decisionmaking is permissible. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2848 (1993) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
547. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.,
joined by White, Brennen, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (holding that race can be considered as a
factor in a university admissions program).
548. United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979) (holding that an affirmative
action plan instituted by a private employer did not violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act).
549. The Court's first affirmative action case was Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
550. 100 U.S. 303 (1880); see supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text (discussing the facts
and holding of Strauder).
551. See supra notes 212-43 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases involving
the use of race in peremptory challenges).
552. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
553. Id. at 309.
554. 380 U.S. 202, 222-24 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991); see supra notes 212-17 and accompa-
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quez, even though the defendant was ultimately convicted by an im-
partial jury, the existence of racial discrimination at the grand jury
phase constituted such great potential for prejudice that the defend-
ant's conviction had to be reversed.557 In Turner v. Murray,558 the
Court held that because of the "unique opportunity for racial
prejudice to operate but remain undetected ' 559 in capital sentencing
hearings where the defendant was convicted of an interracial crime,
the defendant must have an opportunity to question prospective ju-
rors on racial prejudice.560
The Court's jury selection cases clearly illustrate that it has ac-
cepted the reality that, "conscious and unconscious racism can af-
fect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts
presented at their trials. 561 Until recently, the Court was not con-
cerned that any of its decisions in the jury selection area might fos-
ter stereotypes about how jurors of one race perceive defendants of a
different race. On the contrary, the cases clearly indicated that the
Court was willing to acknowledge that racial prejudice by jurors can
compromise the fairness of a trial.562 If the potential for juror bias is
only a stereotype, then there was no reason for the Court to rule the
way it did in Batson.63 Further, no reason would exist for prosecu-
tors to use their peremptory challenges to exclude all prospective
jurors who are of the same race as the defendant. 56 Nevertheless,
according to Chief Justice Burger, unexplained peremptory chal-
lenges are appropriate precisely because they allow lawyers to co-
vertly rely on stereotypical assumptions about how prospective ju-
nying text (discussing the facts and holding of Swain).
555. 476 U.S. 79, 83, 94-98 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991); see
supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of Batson).
556. 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986); see supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts and holding of Vasquez).
557. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263.
558. 476 U.S. 28 (1986); see supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text (discussing the facts
and holding of Turner).
559. Turner, 476 U.S. at 34-35.
560. Id. at 36-37.
561. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2364 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
562. See, e.g., Turner, 476 U.S. at 34-35 (stating that, "[b]ecause of the range of discretion
entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial
prejudice to operate but remain undetected").
563. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (setting forth a standard by which a
defendant can make a prima facie showing of discrimination in the selection of the jury).
564. Id. at 83.
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rors will decide a case. 565 Thus, although the Shaw majority is
opposed to relying on stereotypes in minority voting cases, 566 similar
stereotypes play a major role in the Court's jury selection
jurisprudence.
In recent jury selection cases such as Powers v. Ohio,567 the Court
seems to place a great deal of emphasis on the "stigma or dishonor"
attached to excluded jurors." 8  In Georgia v. McCollum, 569  the
Court went so far as to say that "[r]egardless of who invokes the
discriminatory challenge, there can be no doubt that the harm is the
same - in all cases, the juror is subjected to open and public racial
discrimination. 570 What the Court has failed to emphasize in these
recent cases is that the greatest danger in excluding members of
certain racial groups from a jury is that it may subject the defend-
ant to a trial by a biased jury.571 Few would deny that the excluded
juror may suffer stigmatic and emotional harm, but the main con-
cern is the rights of the defendant. 572 After all, it is the defendant
who could face penalties involving fines, imprisonment, and possibly
even death. It is illogical to conclude, as the Court did in Powers,
that a defendant will challenge a race-based exclusion of a juror
because of a burning desire to maintain "the integrity of the judicial
process. '57  The only reasonable purpose for bothering to bring such
565. Id. at 121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving
'Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975)).
566. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827, 2828 (1993).
567. 499 U.S. 400 (1991); see supra notes 232-37 and accompanying text (discussing the facts
and holding Powers).
568. "[T]he assumption that no stigma or dishonor attaches [to the excluded juror] contravenes
accepted equal protection principles." Powers, 499 U.S. at 410; see also Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991) ("[D]iscrimination on the basis of race in selecting a
jury in a civil proceeding harms the excluded juror no less than discrimination in a criminal
trial.").
569. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); see supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts and holding of McCollum).
570. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353.
571. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (stating that discrimination of ju-
rors based on race violates the defendant's equal protection rights). Similarly in Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Court held that a statute which allowed women to serve as jurors
only if they volunteered violated a defendant's right to "a jury drawn from a fair cross section of
the community." Id. at 530.
572. But see Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose
Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 726-27 (1992) (arguing that the primary victim of
a lawyer's exclusion of a juror based on race is the juror). In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991), the Court discussed the practical and legal barriers facing an excluded juror who brings
suit. Id. at 414.
573. Powers, 499 U.S. at 414 (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
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an action is the belief that a jury which consisted of the excluded
jurors would have treated the defendant more fairly than the jury
that ultimately convicted him. 574
Until 1991, the Court accepted this belief as a reality.57 5 That
jurors would decide a case unfairly because of a defendant's race is
disturbing to consider,5 76 but recent events illustrate that this belief
is not unsound. For example, many commentators believed race
played a major role in the two Rodney King trials,"' 7 as well as in
the trial of Detroit police officers who were convicted of the second-
degree murder of an African-American, 578 and in the infamous O.J.
Simpson case.579
Again, one can make an analogy between jury selection and vot-
ing rights. In the same way that criminal defendants believe that
jurors of their own racial group will better understand their exper-
iences and possibly exercise more empathy toward them in the guilt
and or sentencing phases of their trial,580 voters also believe that the
representatives they vote for will better understand and strive to
achieve their interests if they are members of the same racial
group. 5 ' Their belief is not a stereotype, but rather an acknowl-
edgement of reality. Although the Shaw Court believes "the auto-
574. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (1993) (arguing that conscious and
unconscious racism exists in the jury decisonmaking process); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Inno-
cence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985) (arguing that there is a tendency among
white juries to convict African-American defendants in situations where whites would have been
acquitted); Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1472, 1559-60 (1988) (arguing
that racially underrepresented juries pose greater risks of unfair verdicts to minority defendants).
575. Before 1991, the Court accepted the fact that by changing the racial composition of a
jury, a prosecutor could change the outcome of a trial. King, supra note 487, at 67.
576. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739, 1741
(1993).
577. See, e.g., Frank Tuerheimer, The Rodney King Verdict: Why and Where to From Here?,
1992 Wis. L. REV. 849, 850 (arguing that race played a major role in the first Rodney King
verdict).
578. See, e.g., Rogers Worthington, Should Justice Peek? Police Trials Raise Questions About
Juries' Makeup, CHI. TRiB., Aug. 29, 1993, at Cl (discussing how recent racially-sensitive trials
focused public attention on the issue of potential juror prejudice).
579. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, For Simpson, a Multiracial Jury Insures Justice, N.Y.
TIMES. Sept. 16, 1994, at A30 (arguing that a jury's racial makeup has historically, and continues
to be of critical importance in determining whether an African-American will be found guilty).
580. See supra notes 561-66 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that jurors of a differ-
ent racial group than the defendant are more likely to give the defendant an unfair trial).
581. See supra notes 490-91 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency for members of
the same race group to vote for candidates who are members of the same group). When a litigant
uses a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror, he is in a sense "voting" against that juror. Like-
wise, he is "voting" for the jurors he does not exclude.
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matic invocation of race stereotypes retards [societal] progress and
causes continued hurt and injury," '582 the majority unwittingly en-
gages in their own racial stereotyping when they state that, "racial
gerrymandering . . . may balkanize us into competing racial fac-
tions."58 By making this statement, the Court actually recognizes
the "stereotype" that African-Americans will typically vote for Af-
rican-Americans and whites will typically vote for whites.58" ' If
color-blindness was indeed a reality at the polls, then the particular
shape of a district would be of absolutely no consequence. By the
same token, if color-blindness was a reality in the courtroom, then
the issue of the particular racial composition of a jury would also be
moot.
4. Even if Race-Consciousness is Unwise in Other Contexts, Vot-
ing Rights Are Different
Even if one does not condone affirmative action, or holds the be-
lief that lawyers should have the right to use peremptory challenges
to exclude jurors for any reason including race, there are sound rea-
sons for allowing legislators to consider race when creating voting
districts. According to the Court, voting is a fundamental right.5 85
Affirmative action cases usually involve receiving preferential em-
ployment or educational opportunities which the Court generally
does not consider fundamental rights.58 In affirmative action situa-
tions, a non-minority who deserves an opportunity to receive higher
education or employment as much as a minority may not get the
opportunity he deserves, simply because of the color of his skin.
Thus, innocent parties can suffer a distinct, immediate, and material
harm from affirmative action programs.5 87 If a non-minority is de-
582. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
583. Id. at 2832.
584. According to the Washington Legal Foundation, which is devoted "to promoting the ideal
of a color-blind society," the white voters "have effectively been cut out of the electoral process,
because the Twelfth District has been designed to ensure that successful candidates have only a
limited need to appeal to the white community." Brief Amici Curiae of Washington Legal Foun-
dation, in Support of Appellants at 15, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357).
585. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
586. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 18, 36-37 (1973) (hold-
ing that education is not a fundamental right).
587. See, e.g., Grofman, Lombardi, supra note 399, at 1246 (stating that under affirmative
action plans, future job prospects for whites may be threatened). The Court has stated that "[a]s
part of this Nation's dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ. 476 U.S.
267, 280-81 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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nied an opportunity he has earned, he has arguably been denied a
right. 588 In voting rights situations, few could argue that non-minor-
ities have earned a right to elect certain officials, or that candidates
have earned a right to win an election. 5 9 Assuming a redistricting
plan results in roughly proportional racial representation, the only
individuals who can possibly suffer harm are incumbents who may
find themselves in a district where their racial group does not form
the majority.590
Beneficiaries of affirmative action programs often suffer harm as
well since people may perceive them as needing preferential treat-
ment because they are less intelligent, less sophisticated or not as
responsible as members of other groups. 591 No comparable stigma
could attach to voters in an majority-minority district 592 even if the
district "is so bizarre on its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds
other than race.' "I" It is difficult to believe that constituents in ra-
cial gerrymanders are stigmatized any more than constituents in
non-racial gerrymanders.5 "9  Furthermore, the creation of majority-
minority districts may actually reduce the amount of stigmatic in-
jury currently experienced by minorities, because the representatives
elected by those districts would serve as role models, not only to
minorities, 59 5 but to non-minorities as well. Non-minorities would
begin to view minority representatives as strong leaders who can
responsibly serve their community's interests.
Affirmative action programs often foster resentment among non-
588. THERNSTROM, supra note 486, at 242.
589. Id. Unlike the situation with educational or employment opportunities, "there are no 'ob-
jective' criteria for elected office." Id.
590. See, e.g., Grofman, Lombardi, supra note 399, at 1246 (arguing that white incumbents
can't claim a "right" to keep their offices after their district is reconfigured).
591. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 350, at 367-68 (discussing negative reactions by white
students toward African-Americans in higher education). For other comprehensive arguments
against affirmative action, see Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social
Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312 (1986) (arguing that civil rights activists have gone from
fighting for equality to campaigning for benefits based entirely on race); William Bradford Reyn-
olds, Affirmative Action Symposium: An Equal Opportunity Scorecard, 21 GA. L. REV. 1007
(1987) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to ensure equal opportunity, not
preferential treatment).
592. THERNSTROM. supra note 486, at 242.
593. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993) (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
594. See supra notes 497-99 and accompanying text (discussing the existence of non-racial
gerrymanders).
595. See Guinier, supra note 490, at 1102-06 (stating that African-American elected officials
provide both psychological and actual benefits to their constituents).
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minorities and give people of all ethnic and racial backgrounds an
excuse to dislike one another.596 Again, this is untrue in the voting
rights context.597 When roughly proportional racial representation
exists and all groups are fairly represented, 598 democracy works at
its best and is consistent with James Madison's vision.599 Diverse
representation fosters a spirit of cooperation and allows people with
different views to work together to solve problems. If it is important
to have diversity and a "robust exchange of ideas" in higher educa-
tion institutions,600 it is vitally important to have such an exchange
in Congress.601 Under such conditions, representatives can confi-
dently pass legislation secure in the knowledge that all group inter-
ests and points of view have been debated and considered. This
should increase the likelihood of the passage of more virtuous legis-
lation that is fair and acceptable to everyone. For example if the
Senate did not have at least one African-American member, it prob-
ably would have had little insight into the resentment African-
Americans feel toward the Confederate flag. 02 The Senate was
about to approve the use of this flag again, as it has for many years
596. "[O]ther [governmental] decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circum-
stances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious
expense of a member of a different race." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting).
597. "To the extent that no other racial group is injured, remedying a Voting Rights Act viola-
tion does not involve preferential treatment. It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment,
and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process." Id. at 2842-43
(White, J., dissenting) (comparing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 295 (1986)
(plurality opinion)). Because the creation of majority-minority districts is much less threatening to
non-minorities than affirmative action, "Congress and the federal courts have generally been more
sympathetic to voting rights claims than to other types of equal protection." Grofman, Lombardi,
supra note 399, at 1247.
598. In 1990, although African-Americans constituted 11.2% of the U.S. population, they held
no seats in the U.S. Senate, only 5.5% of the seats in the House of Representatives, and 5.9% of
the state legislative seats. Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory
State, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING. supra note 35, at 177, 189. Latinos, who consti-
tute 8% of the population, held only 2% of the U.S. Congressional seats and 1.5% of the state
legislative seats. Id. In 1986, out of all the elected offices in the U.S., African-Americans held
1.3 % of them. Robert C. Smith, Liberal Jurisprudence and the Quest for Racial Representation,
15 S.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1988).
599. Guinier, supra note 490, at 1105 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (re-
jecting elitist plutocracy)). According to John Adams, legislatures should be "an exact portrait, in
miniature, of the people at large." Polsby & Popper, supra note 458, at 666 (citing Letter from
John Adams to John Penn (Jan. 1776), in 1V WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 203, 205 (Boston, Charles
C. Little & James Brown 1851)).
600. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) (plurality opinion).
601. "[A]llowing for elected representation under racially polarized voting conditions may well
facilitate the breaking down of some racial and ethnic barriers." Issacharoff, supra note 172, at
1880.
602. A U.S. Senate More Like America, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1993, at B7.
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in the past, as part of an emblem of an organization called the
Daughters of the Confederacy.60 " However, after a speech made by
the Senate's only African-American member, Carol Moseley-Braun,
the Senate voted to reject it.604
It is arguable that the absence of African-American jurors at the
trial of an African-American does not necessarily mean the jurors
were biased, or their verdict was unjust.6 05 The fact that studies
have indicated that in some cases African-American jurors can be
more severe on African-American defendants, adds credence to this
argument. 606 However, no published studies indicate that minority
representatives represent their minority group's interests less effec-
tively than non-minorities. One explanation for why African-Ameri-
can jurors may be more severe on African-American defendants is
because victims of crime are usually of the same race as the perpe-
trator.60 7 One would have extreme difficulty arguing that an Afri-
can-American elected representative shows a similar in-group bias
toward his constituency.
IV. IMPACT
The heads of the Congressional Black and Hispanic Caucuses are,
"seek[ing] legislation to lessen the practical harm of the decision
. . . [by] drawing on the advice of legal scholars and other inter-
ested parties."608 Many believe that after the Shaw decision, several
unusually-shaped congressional districts around the country are vul-
nerable to legal challenges. 0 9 The Black Caucus stated, "'The
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. Underwood, supra note 572, at 730.
606. See King, supra note 487, at 97 n.129 (citing studies).
607. See Irene Sege, Race, Violence Make Complex Picture, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1990, at
I (stating that most victims of violent crime are attacked by someone of their own race); Calvin
W. Rolark, A National Crisis, THE ETHNIC NEWSWATCH, Aug. 12, 1992, at 12 (citing NAACP
report which stated that 94% of the African-Americans murdered in the U.S. were killed by
African-Americans).
608. Susan B. Glasser, Court Scraps South Carolina Map, ROLL CALL, July 15, 1993, availa-
ble in LEXIS, News Library, Rollcl File. This article also discusses how a federal court ordered
the South Carolina legislature to eliminate its current redistricting plan and create a new one by
April 1, 1994. One of the judges noted that, "'the 6th district might have a problem facing
scrutiny under Shaw.' " Id. The Sixth District was an oddly-shaped majority-minority district
which elected an African-American from South Carolina to Congress for the first time in nearly a
century. Id. Representative James Clyburn, who was elected by the Sixth District, has not re-
sponded as of the date of this publication to the author's request for comments on the situation in
South Carolina.
609. See infra notes 613, 619 (citing examples of post-Shaw cases).
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highest Court in the land has plunged into disarray the standing
precedent and legal criteria used in determining the efficacy of ex-
isting district configurations.' "610
Louisiana's Fourth District, currently held by Cleo Fields,61" ' was
challenged prior to the ruling in Shaw, and a decision was post-
poned pending resolution of the Shaw case.6 2 A U.S. district court
subsequently struck down the district as an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander, and held that the state redistricting plan did not fur-
ther any compelling governmental interest.6 1 3 The African-Ameri-
can majority district was previously described as, "an ungainly look-
ing Z'' " and "a stepped-on spider, roaming all over the map."61' In
relying primarily on Shaw, the district court found the plan was
clearly the product of racial gerrymandering," 6 and rejected the
state's argument that conformity with the Voting Rights Act, pro-
portional representation of African-Americans in Louisiana, or rem-
edying the effects of past racial discrimination were compelling gov-
ernmental interests in this case. 17
Similarly, Texas's Eighteenth District formerly held by Represen-
tative Craig Washington and Twenty-Ninth currently held by Rep-
resentative Gene Green (who is white), were said to "twist about
wildly to cram [in] as many blacks or Hispanics as possible." 1 8
These districts, along with the Thirtieth, were also recently declared
unconstitutional." 9 As in the Louisiana case, the court determined
610. Glasser, supra note 24. But see Grofman, High Court Ruling, supra note 382, at 19
(arguing that the Shaw case probably will not result in a major attack on the Voting Rights Act).
611. As of the date of this publication, Representative Fields has not responded to the author's
request for comments on the situation in Louisiana.
612. Susan B. Glasser, Just How 'Bizarre' is Louisiana's 4th?, ROLL CALL, Aug. 16, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Rollcl File.
613. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (W.D. La. 1993). The Supreme Court
granted a stay of the district court's judgment pending the filing of statements as to jurisdiction in
the Court. Louisiana v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 31 (1994). The Court then granted certiorari in Louisi-
ana v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 687 (1994). Similarly, in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 713 (1995), the
Court granted certiorari after a district court ruled that Georgia's Eleventh District violated the
Equal Protection Clause as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F.
Supp. 1354, 1359 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
614. Glasser, supra note 24.
615. Redistricting: This Could Get Ugly, AM. POL. NETWORK, INc. THE HOTLINE, July 7,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Hotlne File.
616. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1194, 1199-205.
617. Id. at 1205. As in Shaw, the Hays court referred to what was taking place in the district
as "segregation" even though only 63% of district four's population was African-American. Id. at
1206-07.
618. Redistricting: A State By State Look, supra note 503.
619. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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that the districts lacked conformity to traditional neutral districting
criteria, and were designed primarily as majority-minority dis-
tricts.620 Further, the court held that the districts were not narrowly
tailored to satisfy the state's interest in avoiding Voting Rights Act
liability. 21
Other majority-minority districts that could be declared unconsti-
tutional after the Shaw case include the following:622 Illinois's
Fourth District currently held by Representative Luis Gutierrez is
described as an "earmuff," '23 and withstood a challenge in 1991;624
Mississippi's Second District currently held by Representative Ben-
nie Thompson is even longer than North Carolina's district and
"runs snake-like along the Mississippi River, 2/3 the length of the
State; ' 62 5 New York's Twelfth District, which is currently held by
Representative Nydia Velasquez, and winds snake-like through
three New York City boroughs, is believed by local experts to be
immune from challenge because of the city's history of discrimina-
tion, racial bloc voting, and the fact that the Latino residents of the
district are not as "widely separated" as the residents in the Shaw
district;626 Florida's Third District held by Representative Corrine
Brown also resembles a long snake,6 27 and the twenty-third held by
Representative Alcee L. Hastings, resembles "a lumpy line that
spans Dade, Broward and Palm Beach and branches off into an area
that includes Lake Okeechobee. '6 28 Due to the inherent difficulty
620. Id.
621. Id.
622. As of the date of this publication, none of the representatives mentioned have responded to
the author's requests for comments on the situation in their respective states. Representative
Kweisi Mfume, head of the Black Congressional Caucus, and Representative Jose Serrano, head
of the Hispanic Congressional Caucus, also have not responded to the author's request for their
comments on the Shaw case.
623. Glasser, supra note 24.
624. Redistricting: A State By State Look, supra note 503.
625. Redistricting: This Could Get Ugly, supra note 615. The Attorney General had approved
the district before the Shaw case. Id.
626. Todd S. Purdum, New Ruling Could Affect New York Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES. June 29,
1992, at B4. Local authorities believe the Shaw case may impede the creation of a third Latino
district in New York, which is what the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund is
currently asking a federal district court judge to order. Id. The lawyer defending New York's
current plan stated: "They'll have a heck of a time trying to draw a third district that doesn't look
very odd." Id.
627. Peter Mitchell, Lawsuit Attacks "Wishbone" District; Action Could Force Boundary
Shifts, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL. Jan. 19, 1994, at Cl.
628. Erick Johnson, Supreme Court's Ruling on District Boundaries Seen as a Setback for
Blacks, MIAMI TIMES. July I, 1993, at al. These are the first two African-Americans from Florida
to serve in Congress since Reconstruction. Glasser, supra note 24.
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under Shaw in determining whether a gerrymander is unconstitu-
tionally bizarre, 29 it is almost impossible to make specific predic-
tions regarding these districts.630 Nevertheless, whatever happens to
the districts, the Shaw decision will almost certainly result in the
number of minority representatives in Congress declining
substantially.
The Supreme Court recently decided two voting rights cases, both
brought under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In the first, John-
son v. De Grandy,6' 3 African-Americans and Latinos claimed that
the Florida legislature violated the Voting Rights Act by dispropor-
tionately representing their voting strengths in Florida's state legis-
lative districting plan.632 Predictably, the Court ruled against the
minority plaintiffs. 633 Ironically, however, the Court stated that the
reason there was no violation was because "minority voters form ef-
fective voting majorities in a number of districts roughly propor-
tional to the minority voters' respective shares in the voting-age
population."634 This reasoning seems inconsistent with the Shaw
case because to give the minority groups proportional representa-
tion, the state would have to create (or at least maintain) districts
based exclusively and obviously on race - an action condemned by
the Shaw majority.635 The Shaw case is not cited in the Court's
opinion, and it is difficult to understand why "roughly proportional
representation" is acceptable in this case but not in Shaw. Perhaps
it is because the De Grandy districts are not quite as "bizarre" look-
ing as the district in Shaw.
The second case is Holder v. Hall,6"' where African-American
voters in Georgia brought suit alleging that the local single-county
commissioner system prevents African-Americans from holding the
629. See supra notes 452-59 and accompanying text (discussing why Shaw's "bizarre" shape
test is unworkable).
630. Two districts interpreting Shaw in almost identical factual situations reached diametri-
cally opposite conclusions. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 417 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (holding a
bizarrely-shaped district constitutional); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (holding a bizarrely-shaped district unconstitutional). These two decisions illustrate that
Shaw has already resulted in a great deal of confusion, uncertainty, and inconsistency in this area
of the law. See supra note 394 (discussing Hunt); see also supra notes 617-20 (discussing Vera).
631. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
632. Id. at 2651-52.
633. Id. at 2651.
634. Id. (emphasis added).
635. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
636. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
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position.. 37 The county is only nineteen percent African-American,
and the position has been held by whites since the office was created
in 1912.838 Since setting up a multi-member board where minority
groups would have a chance at proportional representation may
"stigmatize" the groups or further "balkanize" our society, one
would probably not expect the Court to order the state legislature to
change the system.
The Court did in fact refuse to issue such an order, albeit on dif-
ferent grounds. It held that the plaintiffs could not maintain a sec-
tion 2 vote dilution suit because they could not present "a reasona-
ble alternative practice as a benchmark against which to measure
the existing voting practice." 3 9 The Court stated that the plaintiffs
failed to show what constitutes a reasonable size for this kind of
governing body, or the principles a court should use when making
such a determination.6 40
One must wonder how far the Court will extend the Shaw analy-
sis, and what effect the case will have on the intentional considera-
tion of political affiliation when creating congressional districts. If it
is a stereotype that members of certain racial groups typically vote
for representatives from that same group, is it also a stereotype that
members of the same political group predictably vote for representa-
tives from that group? If the latter is indeed a mere stereotype, one
must wonder why legislatures work so hard to create districts that
will represent all interests. A local example is the "carving up" of
the Cook County Board of Illinois into seventeen single-member dis-
tricts. The plan includes several unusually-shaped racial and politi-
cal gerrymanders. If racial gerrymanders are subject to legal chal-
lenges because they reinforce stereotypes, then a similar argument
could be made concerning political gerrymanders.6 4'
CONCLUSION
It is imperative that we continue to strive to end racial polariza-
tion in this country and achieve the ideal of our nation's motto: E.
637. Id. at 2584-85.
638. Id. at 2584.
639. Id. at 2585.
640. Id. at 2586-88.
641. For a discussion of controversies surrounding the map and the interests of various groups,
see Andrew Fegelman, County Board Approves Map of Voting Districts, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22,
1993, § I, at 6; Bonnie Miller Rubin, Cook County Board District Map is Cutting the Wrong
Way, CHI. TRIB.. Sept. 23, 1993, at 2.
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Pluribus Unum (One out of many). We can learn from the hard
lessons of others that the creation of societal divisions based on im-
mutable characteristics can only lead to disaster, as exemplified by
the extreme ethnic and religious polarization that has led to bloody
civil war and even genocide in Bosnia6 2 and Rwanda.64 Likewise,
we cannot let the ideal of color-blindness blind us from reality.",
Racial divisions have existed in this country for hundreds of years
and continue to exist today. The fact that organizations such as the
Black and Hispanic Congressional Caucuses exist is clear evidence
of this fact. Although race-relations have improved, we are still in a
stage of transition between the destructive race-consciousness of our
past, and the color-blindness of our ideal future. When significant
numbers of whites are consistently elected from African-American
majority districts, and significant numbers of African-Americans
are consistently elected from white-majority districts, we can finally
put an end to race-conscious gerrymandering. Until that day arrives,
however, fair representation through racial gerrymandering is
needed during this critical time in our nation's slow but steady de-
velopment. By overlooking these realities, the Supreme Court in the
Shaw case inadvertently places more obstacles on the road to true
color-blindness.
James B. Zouras
642. See Roger Cohen, Cross v. Crescent; The Battle Lines Are Being Drawn In Bosnia Along
Old Religious Scars, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 17, 1992, at A 14 (describing the historical religious differ-
ences which has led to the fighting in Bosnia); see also Janusz Bugajski, Dispel Balkan Myths,
Demand Minority Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 27, 1993 (discussing how religious and
ethnic stereotypes may have created and perpetuated Bosnian conflict).
643. See Troops Join Flood of Civilians Fleeing Besieged Rwandan Capital, CHI. TRIB., May
27, 1994, at A6 (describing the "ethnic slaughter and fighting" in Rwanda).
644. Dayna Cunningham, a voting rights litigator with the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, who submitted an amicus brief in the Shaw case stated: "'This notion of color-
blindness is pure fiction. . . . It doesn't exist. And what it says is we're going to ignore racism and
racial prejudice. We're going to ignore the discriminatory impact of various so-called neutral prac-
tices. See no evil. And who gets hurt by that?' " Lynne Duke, Advocates Say Justices Muddy
Voting Rights; Decision in North Carolina Congressional Redistricting Case Criticized as "Uto-
pianism," WASH. POST. June 30, 1993, at A8 (quoting Dayna Cunningham).
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